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I. INTRODUCTION
Since Congress began to regulate consumer credit in earnest by
passing the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)1 in 1968, creditors have had to
disclose the essential elements of their credit transactions.2 TILA was a
welcome development given the nature of the competition in the
marketplace, for consumers were able thereafter to compare the credit
opportunities available to them.3 Lenders could no longer devise their
own disclosure strategies for making their loan programs more
attractive, because they had to follow a prescribed statutory formula that
put everybody on an even playing field. It became easier for consumers
to understand how much they were paying for credit, because a loan’s
finance charge no longer meant different things to different people.4 The
new disclosure rules introduced a standard method for recognizing the
true cost of credit, and they comprised the same elements regardless of
the lender’s standing in the business community.5

1. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2000)).
2. For example, creditors have to disclose the amount financed and the finance
charge expressed as an annual percentage rate. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)(A), (a)(3), (a)(4)
(2000).
3. A House report reflected some of the legislative concerns as follows:
Today the consumer is faced with a number of credit disclosure practices,
most of which are not directly comparable to one another. With respect to rate,
some creditors employ an “add on” rate, which is based on the original balance
of the obligation as opposed to the declining balance. This has the effect of
understating the simple annual rate by approximately 50 percent.
....
The committee believes that by requiring all creditors to disclose credit
information in a uniform manner, and by requiring all additional mandatory
changes imposed by the creditor as an incident to credit be included in the
computation of the applicable percentage rate, the American consumer will be
given the information he needs to compare the cost of credit and to make the
best informed decision on the use of credit.
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1970–71.
4. One authority identified the problem this way:
Creditors did not use a uniform way of calculating interest, or a single system
for defining what additional charges would be included in the interest rate.
Thus, a consumer had no way of knowing, for example, that a $6000 car
financed through the dealer at 6% might well have been more expensive than
financing it at 10% through a credit union.
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 1.1.1 (5th ed. 2003 & Supp. 2006).
5. TILA provides an all-inclusive definition of “finance charge.” It defines the
“finance charge” as the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to
whom the credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an
incident to the extension of credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000). TILA contains several

612

GRIFFITH.DOC

[VOL. 44: 611, 2007]

11/15/2007 8:59:09 AM

Truth in Lending
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Regulation Z, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to
TILA,6 identifies the finance charge as the cost of consumer credit and
further explains that it includes any charge that the lender imposes as “an
incident to or a condition of the extension of credit.”7 It is not surprising
that there are sometimes disagreements over the “incident” or “condition”
language, for the mere fact that a consumer must pay a charge in a
transaction does not always mean that such a charge is in fact incident to
or a condition of the extension of credit.8 This Article will first tackle
the problems of identifying the essential elements of a finance charge by
discussing some recent cases. It will be seen that a charge that a consumer
pays in connection with a transaction does not necessarily make it a
finance charge, and that courts must look further before categorizing a
consumer’s payment.9
Another feature of Truth in Lending that has been the subject of debate
is the consumer’s right of rescission. Under normal circumstances, a
consumer may rescind a transaction until midnight of the third business
day following consummation, delivery of the notice of the right of
rescission, or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever comes
last.10 When the consumer rescinds within three business days, there is
usually no problem because the consumer has an unconditional right to

exceptions to the definition. See id.; see also RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER,
TRUTH IN LENDING ¶ 3.02[1] (2000).
6. Congress authorized the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to prescribe
regulations to carry out the purposes of TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a). As a result, the
Board issued Regulation Z. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2007).
7. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (2007).
8. TILA uses the language “incident to,” 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000), but
Regulation Z goes further and uses the phrase “incident to or a condition of the extension
of credit,” 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (2007). In 1996, the Board revised Regulation Z to
recognize a fee charged in connection with debt collection agreements as a finance
charge because it is part of the cost of credit. The Board regarded the fee as being
charged in connection with the loan, and therefore incident to the extension of credit.
See Regulation Z, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,237, 49,239 (Sept. 19, 1996).
9. In Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 240 (2004), the
Supreme Court recognized that there was some connection between an over-limit fee and
an extension of credit. Nevertheless, the Court recognized also that TILA’s categorization of
the over-limit fee as one assessed “in connection with an extension of credit” did not
mean that it was imposed “incident to the extension of credit.” Id. at 241 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court upheld the Board’s exclusion of the
over-limit fee from the finance charge. Id. at 245.
10. 15 U.S.C. §1635(f) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2007).
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do so.11 If the lender has failed to discharge its disclosure obligations,
the consumer’s right of rescission can last as long as three years.
Nevertheless, once the three-day period expires, the lender is normally
not receptive to the consumer’s rescission and the consumer must then
try to show how the lender has failed to meet the disclosure requirements.12
Many lenders have tried to avoid the challenge of the rescission
procedure by coaxing the consumer into signing a form indicating that the
consumer prematurely elects not to cancel the transaction.13 A lender
normally seeks this assurance before the three-day rescission expires in
order to disburse the funds promptly without worrying about the consumer’s
change of heart. The lender’s zeal to consummate a transaction often leads
to disagreement about whether the lender gave the necessary clear and
conspicuous disclosures when it mixed the premature election language
with the notice of the consumer’s right to rescind.14 This Article will show
both that the courts have consistently protected the consumer’s right to
rescind and that major difficulties ensue when lenders try to avoid the
nuances of the rescission procedure.
Apart from the complications of rescission, a lender must confront the
timing and form of the Truth in Lending disclosures.15 A lender’s disclosures
mean much more to a consumer when the consumer has access to them
for full review before consummation of the transaction. The problem in
this context is whether the lender satisfies the regulatory requirement of
giving its consumers a copy of the disclosures that they can keep prior to
consummation. If all the copies of the disclosures are bound together,
the consumer may argue that he does not have a copy he can keep, and
then it is up to him to convince a court that he was unable to walk away
11. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.3.1; ROHNER & MILLER,
supra note 5, ¶ 8.01.
12. See Jones v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 397 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2005); Gaona v.
Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118
(9th Cir. 1989); England v. MG Investments, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 718 (S.D. W. Va.
2000); Stanley v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Stanley), 315 B.R. 602 (Bankr. D. Kan.
2004); Webster v. Centex Home Equity Corp. (In re Webster), 300 B.R. 787 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 2003); Williams v. BankOne (In re Williams), 291 B.R. 636 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 2003); Johnson v. Thomas, 794 N.E.2d 919 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
13. See Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994); Rodrigues v.
Members Mortgage Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 202 (D. Mass. 2004); Adams v. Nationscredit
Fin. Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Wiggins v. Avco Fin. Servs., 62
F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 1999); Apaydin v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank (In re Apaydin), 201
B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
14. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1144; Adams, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 830; Wiggins, 62 F.
Supp. 2d at 93.
15. In closed-end transactions, the creditor must make the disclosures “clearly and
conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may keep.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(1)
(2007). With respect to timing, the creditor must make the disclosures “before consummation
of the transaction.” Id. § 226.17(b).
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with a copy before committing himself to the transaction.16 The argument
usually is that the lender did not provide the disclosures in a form that
the consumer could keep. Allied to this issue of the timing and form of
the disclosures is the matter of the timing of consummation.17 Any discussion
of this issue must necessarily deal with the conditions that are attached
to the financing of the transaction between the parties. An examination
of the cases will show that the courts generally look to see whether the
consumer was contractually obligated on the transaction or whether a
condition prevented that from happening.18
Consumers may also be surprised about what awaits them once an
agreement is in effect. That surprise may come as the result of a changein-terms provision that the lender uses to its own advantage.19 A consumer
who is attracted by the lender’s solicitations may later find that a promised
term is short-lived because of another provision in the agreement that
allows for a change in terms at the lender’s behest. Occasionally that change
is the insertion of an arbitration clause, and a court has to decide whether
an arbitrator or a court should deal with a consumer’s challenge.20
Finally there is the question of damages when a lender is found liable
for a Truth in Lending violation. This Article will discuss the amounts

16. The problem normally arises when the disclosures are placed on the same
document with the credit contract, and the document comprises multiple copies bound
together. If the creditor gives the consumer these multiple copies clipped together, it is
open to question whether the creditor has given the disclosures to the consumer in a form
that the consumer may keep. The Official Staff Commentary recognizes that “[t]he
consumer must be free to take possession of and review the document in its entirety
before signing.” 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)(3) (2007). The staff of the Board
issues interpretations of Regulation Z through the Official Staff Commentary and a
creditor’s reliance on the Commentary protects the creditor from civil liability under TILA.
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1 (2007).
17. Regulation Z defines “consummation” as “the time that a consumer becomes
contractually obligated on a credit transaction.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13) (2007).
18. See Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1067 (11th Cir. 2004);
Grimes v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 340 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2003); Gaona v.
Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2003); Graves v. Tru-Link Fence
Co., 905 F. Supp. 515, 520 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
19. See Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 342 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2003);
Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002); Stone v. Golden
Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Perry v. FleetBoston
Fin. Corp., No. 04-507, 2004 WL 1508518 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004).
20. See Stone, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 193; Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d
819, 821 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 275 (Ct. App.
1998).
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that are available in lease and non-lease transactions,21 and will identify
the kinds of violations that give rise thereto.22
II. THE FINANCE CHARGE
A. Characterizing the Charge
The search for truth in lending spans a wide area. A creditor must
disclose enough information so that consumers will be well informed
about the essential ingredients of the loan that they are contemplating.23
Perhaps the greatest challenge for a creditor is in disclosing the finance
charge for the loan and expressing it as an annual percentage rate
(APR).24 Sometimes a creditor will have problems because it is unsure
whether a particular item should be included in the finance charge.
TILA provides some guidance about the meaning of “finance charge” by
defining it as an amount that a creditor imposes “as an incident to the
extension of credit” to the consumer.25 Regulation Z uses slightly different
21. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004) (applying the
$100/$1,000 limits on TILA’s statutory damages to both leases and non-real-estate loans
under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (2000)).
22. The issue that crops up in this connection is whether a consumer can recover
statutory damages for a creditor’s failure to make timely disclosures. Compare Lozada
v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 878, 889 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding
that §1640(a) allows statutory damages to be awarded for violations of § 1638(b)(1)),
and Walters v. First State Bank, 134 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding that
consumer could recover statutory damages and any actual damages because creditor gave him
a copy of disclosures only after the consumer signed the contract), with Baker v. Sunny
Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that statutory damages are
not available for dealer’s failure to make timely disclosures under § 1638(b)(1)), and
Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 319 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that
creditor’s liability arose when consummation occurred under unfunded financing agreement),
rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004), and Graham v. RRR, LLC, 202 F. Supp. 2d
483, 488 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that consumer must prove actual damages in order to
recover for dealer’s untimely disclosures under § 1638(b), since statutory damages are
not available).
23. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a (2007) (disclosures in credit and charge card applications
and solicitations); id. § 226.6 (initial disclosure statement in open-end credit); id. § 226.18
(content of disclosures in closed-end credit). “Open-end credit” contemplates repeated
transactions between the consumer and the creditor, id. § 226.2(a)(20), while “closedend credit” means consumer credit other than open-end credit, id. § 226.2(a)(10).
24. See id. § 226.7(f), (g) (periodic statements in open-end transactions), id. § 226.18(d), (e)
(disclosures in closed-end credit). The terms “finance charge” and “annual percentage rate”
must, with certain exceptions, be disclosed more conspicuously than any other disclosure. Id.
§ 226.5(a)(2); id. § 226.17(a)(2).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000). The congressional report explained the disclosure
of the finance charge in these terms: “The basic disclosure concept contained in the
proposed legislation is to require lenders and merchants to provide consumers with a
statement of the ‘finance charge’ imposed by the creditor in connection with the
particular consumer credit transaction.” H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1971. Then in its section-by-section analysis, the report
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language by identifying the finance charge as “the cost of consumer
credit” and then by stating that it includes any charge imposed “as an
incident to or a condition of the extension of credit.”26 The similarity in
language suggests that the Board tried its level best to capture Congress’s
intent by ensuring that a creditor must inform the consumer of the true
cost of credit.
From time to time, disagreements arise over the proper designation of
a charge, and it is then that a court must look to see whether the creditor
has assessed the charge on the consumer “as an incident to or a condition
of the extension of credit.”27 Not all charges are a part of the finance charge.28
Regulation Z gives some examples of costs that are included in the
finance charge, but it also specifically excludes others from the definition.
One charge that the regulation excludes from the finance charge is that
imposed on a consumer for exceeding a credit limit.29 When the consumer
in Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig complained about the creditor’s
failure to include such an item in the finance charge, it was left to the
Supreme Court to decide whether the Board had gone too far by
excluding such an over-limit fee.30
The Court had to decide first whether Congress had directly addressed
the issue. If it had not, then the regulation would be controlling unless it
was “arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”31 The Court recognized some ambiguity in the term “finance
charge” as it related to over-limit fees in this transaction.32 This was not
surprising, given the requirement that the charge had to be “incident to
explained the definition of “finance charge” as “all mandatory charges imposed by a
creditor and payable by an obligor as an incident to the extension of credit.” Id. at 23,
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1980. This “incident to” and “in connection with”
language also came up again in the context of including voluntary debt cancellation fees
in the finance charge. The Board interpreted the definition of “finance charge” to include
“any fee charged by the creditor in connection with the loan, if it is not charged in
comparable cash transactions and is not subject to an express exemption.” Regulation Z,
61 Fed. Reg. 49,237, 49,239 (Sept. 19, 1996).
26. 12 C.F.R § 226.4(a) (2007).
27. Id.
28. See id. § 226.4(c)–(e).
29. See id. § 226.4(c)(3).
30. 541 U.S. 232 (2004).
31. Id. at 242 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
32. The Court explained: “While we acknowledge that there may be some fees not
explicitly addressed by § 1605(a)’s definition of ‘finance charge’ but which are unambiguously
included in or excluded by that definition, over-limit fees are not such fees.” Id.
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the extension of credit.”33 The Court was not sure whether the phrase
“incident to” required a substantial connection between the charge
and the credit, and therefore, there was some doubt whether the finance
charge included over-limit fees.34 The Court also observed that it was
reasonable to characterize such fees as a penalty because a creditor
imposes them only when the consumer exceeds his credit limit.35 On the
other hand, the creditor would not have imposed its fee if the consumer
had not exceeded her credit limit. It was this feature that contributed to
the ambiguity of the charge. It was this aspect of the transaction that led
the court of appeals below to characterize the fee as a finance charge,36
because the consumer seemed to benefit from an extension of credit,
even though the creditor was not enthusiastic about it.37
Although TILA provides that a consumer may incur two types of
charges in an open-end credit plan, namely a finance charge and other
charges imposed as part of the plan, it does not specify which charges
comprise each category.38 This is a further example of the ambiguity
that the Pfennig Court recognized in addressing the reasonableness of
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000). In the case of an application or solicitation for a
credit card account, TILA requires a creditor to disclose applicable percentage rates,
annual fees, and other information. Id. § 1637(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (c)(1)(B). As part of the
“other information” required, the creditor must disclose “[a]ny fee imposed in connection
with an extension of credit in excess of the amount of credit authorized to be extended
with respect to such account.” Id. § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii). The language “in connection
with an extension of credit” is different from “incident to the extension of credit.” This
difference suggests that the over-limit charge does not fall within the finance charge and
creates the ambiguity identified by the Court. See Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 241.
34. The Court agreed that there is some connection. See Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 241.
But in making its point that the term “finance charge” is ambiguous standing alone, the
Court explained: “[T]his Court has recognized that the phrase ‘incident to or in
conjunction with’ implies some necessary connection between the antecedent and its
object, although it ‘does not place beyond rational debate the nature or extent of the
required connection.’” Id. at 240–41 (quoting Holly Farms Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations
Bd., 517 U.S. 392, 403 n.9 (1996)).
35. See id. at 243.
36. See Pfennig v. Household Credit Servs., Inc., 295 F.3d 522, 528–29 (6th Cir.
2002), rev’d, 541 U.S. 232 (2004). The consumer alleged that the card issuer “knowingly and
routinely” allowed its customers to exceed the credit limits. Id. at 529 n.2.
37. The Supreme Court would not accept the distinction that the court of appeals
had made between unilateral acts of default and acts of default when a consumer exceeds
his credit limit. See Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 244. It was the Court’s view that “a creditor’s
‘authorization’ of a particular point-of-sale transaction [did] not represent a final
determination that a particular transaction [was] within a consumer’s credit limit because
the authorization system [was] not suited to identify instantaneously and accurately overlimit transactions.” Id.
38. Subsections 1637(a)(1)–(4) relate in one way or another to the finance charge,
but paragraph 5 then requires disclosure of “other charges” which the creditor may impose
under the open-end credit plan. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(1)–(5) (2000). This suggests, therefore,
that Congress contemplated other charges besides the finance charge. But TILA’s
examples of a finance charge do not include over-limit fees. See id. § 1605(a).
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the regulation. However, this much is clear: Congress did not intend to
include all charges within the finance charge.39 The challenge is, therefore, in
deciphering where each charge belongs. The drafters did not help much
in clarifying the issue for the over-limit fee. They identified the specific
items that a creditor had to disclose in applications and solicitations for
credit, but they alluded to other information that must be disclosed to
complete the picture. Included in that information was “[a]ny fee imposed
in connection with an extension of credit in excess of the amount of credit
authorized.”40 It was open to question whether Congress was sending a
message that although this over-limit fee was not imposed “incident to
the extension of credit,” it was nevertheless a fee that a consumer should
know about before applying for a credit card.41 This could explain why
Congress opted for the phrase “in connection with” rather than “incident to”
when it dealt with mail applications and solicitations under § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii).
It wanted to give a complete picture of the credit transaction without
necessarily fitting every conceivable expense into the category of a
“finance charge.”42 TILA’s definition of that term makes no mention
of over-limit fees, but by the same token it does not specifically exclude
them as it does with respect to other items charged to the consumer.43
The Court in Pfennig seized on the ambiguity in TILA’s treatment (or
lack thereof) of the over-limit fees as an invitation to determine the
reasonableness of the regulation in dealing with this matter.44

39. The statute recognizes disclosures that are related to the finance charge, 15
U.S.C. § 1637(a)(1)–(4), and also requires “[i]dentification of other charges which may
be imposed as part of the plan,” id. § 1637(a)(5).
40. Id. § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii).
41. This is one place where the statute points out the difference between “in
connection with” and “incident to” an extension of credit. Compare id. § 1605(a), with
id. § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii). The “in connection with” language appears in § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii),
dealing with disclosure in direct mail applications and solicitations for credit card
accounts, but the reference to the over-limit fee relates to “other information” that the
creditor must disclose besides matters concerning the finance charge.
42. For example, the finance charge does not include charges that are payable in a
comparable cash transaction. See id. § 1605(a).
43. See id. § 1605(d)–(e).
44. The Court stated: “Because § 1605 is ambiguous, the Board’s regulation
implementing § 1605 ‘is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” Household Credit Servs.,
Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232 (2004) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 227 (2001)).
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Regulation Z excludes from the finance charge any charge “for exceeding
a credit limit.”45 There is no doubt about what the Board had in mind
here. The only question is whether this exclusion was reasonable in light of
TILA’s overall objective.46 It is relevant that the regulation excludes
charges from the finance charge not only when consumers exceed their
credit limits, but also when they make unanticipated late payments, become
delinquent, or default on an obligation.47 These are all events that follow
an extension of credit and a diligent consumer may avoid such charges
by complying with the terms of his loan.48 Therefore, this kind of charge
looks more like a penalty than anything else, because it arises only when
a consumer breaches the terms of his credit agreement, and it is not part
and parcel of the original credit transaction.49
Although the Court in Pfennig recognized as reasonable the Board’s
decision to exclude the over-limit charge from the finance charge, such
an exclusion seems to depend on events that are largely within the
consumer’s control. If the creditor in Pfennig did allow the consumer to
exceed her original credit limit, some people would understandably treat
this as an extension of credit, with any resulting fees being part of the
finance charge.50 This is not to say that it would be unreasonable for the
45. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2) (2007).
46. The Supreme Court has held that an agency’s regulation must be “given
controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
47. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2) (2007).
48. Some commentators note that such charges are imposed “not as a charge for
the credit, but to compensate for the costs related to the occurrence of specified
conditions.” ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 5, ¶ 3.02[2][d]; see also 1 JAMES H.
PANNABECKER, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL ¶ 2.01[3] (rev. ed. 2007).
49. In this connection, the Board made the following observation when it was
considering a revision to Regulation Z to implement amendments that Congress had
made to simplify TILA:
[T]he regulation reflects an emphasis on disclosures that are relevant to credit
decisions, as opposed to disclosures related to events occurring after the initial
credit choice. In the Board’s view, the primary goals of the Truth in Lending
Act are not particularly enhanced by regulatory provisions relating to changes
in terms on outstanding obligations and on the effects of the failure to comply
with the terms of the obligation.
Credit; Truth in Lending; Revision of Regulation Z, 45 Fed. Reg. 80,648, 80,649 (Dec.
5, 1980).
50. The Supreme Court would not accept the Sixth Circuit’s distinction between
“‘unilateral’ acts of default and acts of default where a consumer exceeds his credit
limit . . . .” Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 244 (2004). The
Court did not see any negotiation between the creditor and the consumer for more credit.
See id. However, more attention should be paid to whether an over-limit charge is akin
to an unanticipated event, as distinguished from a routine occurrence that is intended to
produce a greater yield for a lender. The exclusion for “exceeding a credit limit” appears
in the context of “[c]harges for actual unanticipated late payment . . . or for delinquency,
default, or a similar occurrence.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2) (2007). This language leaves
the impression that the over-limit event should not result from an agreement between the
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Board to exclude all penalties from such a charge. But it is problematic
for a creditor to set a credit limit and then routinely assess a fee whenever a
consumer exceeds that unrealistic limit. If a creditor’s authorization of a
particular transaction does not represent a final decision that the transaction
definitely falls within the consumer’s credit limit, then it is understandable
that the Supreme Court would uphold the Board’s reasonable regulation.
The Court was in effect saying that where the only outstanding arrangement
is the original credit agreement, any subsequent advances that exceed
that agreement will carry with it an attendant charge. Until there is some
other extension of credit, the consumer’s breach of the agreement leads
to a charge that is akin to a late payment or a default charge.51
The difficulty in Pfennig is that § 1605(a) does not specifically cover
over-limit fees and the Board filled the gap with its regulation covering
such fees. Even when TILA mentions over-limit fees, the reference occurs
in the context of the creditor’s providing additional information to the
consumer about fees that may be imposed in connection with the extension
of credit, rather than incident thereto.52 This provided a sufficient opening
for the Court to recognize that imposition of fees in connection with the
extension of credit does not clearly make such fees incident to the extension
of credit.53
The definition of “finance charge” has caused problems in other contexts.
In Virachack v. University Ford, a question arose about a rebate that
was available to any consumer who paid cash or took a loan at a regular,
nonpromotional rate.54 The rebate was not available for a loan that carried
the low promotional rate of 0.9%. The consumers argued that, because

parties for additional credit, but rather from an unexpected, nonroutine advance. This
understanding of an over-limit charge flows from the context. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:16 (6th ed. 2000); see also ROHNER &
MILLER, supra note 5, ¶ 3.02[2][d].
51. The consumer undercut her case by alleging that the over-limit fee was imposed for
every month when her balance exceeded her original credit limit. See Pfennig, 541 U.S.
at 240.
52. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii) (2000) (imposing over-the-limit fee
“in connection with an extension of credit in excess of the amount of credit authorized”),
with 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000) (imposing finance charge “as an incident to the
extension of credit”).
53. See Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 241; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note
4, § 3.9.3.2.
54. 410 F.3d 579 (9th Cir. 2005).
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they did not qualify for the rebate, the creditor should have disclosed the
difference in price as a finance charge.55
The court in Virachack looked to Regulation Z for a resolution of the
question. The regulation includes within the definition of “finance charge”
those discounts given “for the purpose of inducing payment by a means
other than the use of credit.”56 In this case, the dealer did not offer a rebate
to induce customers to use means other than credit, since the rebate was
available to consumers who financed their purchase at the nonpromotional
higher rate.57 The creditor did not want to offer two incentives to the
same consumer. The consumer could either get the 0.9% loan, or he could
take the higher interest loan and qualify for the rebate. In a word, the
manufacturer’s subsidy was available only to customers who were not
getting the subsidized interest rate.58 There was an important element
missing in the transaction if the consumers hoped to make their case for
a hidden finance charge. They could not show that the dealer had any
intention to induce cash payments, for the sales price was the same for
both cash and credit transactions.59 The rebate became relevant only after
the dealer ascertained that the consumer was not getting the preferred
interest rate.
In a rebate-type case, the appropriate comparison is not between
consumers using the specific type of credit and cash customers. It is,
instead, a comparison between credit customers as a group and cash
customers. Under the arrangement in Virachack, some credit customers
could benefit from the low interest arrangement, while others could
not.60 Therefore, one would have difficulty in finding the necessary
inducement for a consumer to pay by some means other than credit. A
consumer would undoubtedly want the benefits of both bargains: the
rebate and also the low interest rate. But at least the rebate would still be
available to a consumer who chose to finance at the higher interest rate.

55. See id. at 581.
56. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(9) (2007).
57. See Virachack, 410 F.3d at 582.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The manufacturer did not want to offer two incentives to the same consumer.
It offered a rebate only to those customers who were not getting a subsidized interest
rate. Id. But the rebate is not a finance charge either when it is available to both cash
and credit customers. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 4(a)-(1)(i)(B) (2007). In Coelho v.
Park Ridge Oldsmobile, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (N.D. Ill. 2003), the same rebate was
available to cash customers and to credit customers who did not use the promotional
interest rate. The court held that the rebate was not a finance charge because “the rebate
affect[ed] the customer’s net out-of-pocket costs, but not the negotiated sale price the
customer owed [the dealer].” Id. at 1009.
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Therefore, it is not only the cash customer who benefits from a rebate,
but credit customers as well.61
B. Incident to or Condition of Extension of Credit
The “incident to” phrase causes problems in another context. If a consumer
has to pay a fee at some point after the initial extension of credit, it may
be in connection with the transaction rather than incident to the extension
of credit.62 In that event, there is less attraction to the lender to categorize
the fee as a finance charge. The consumer may not see it as something
other than a finance charge if he is unable to consummate the transaction
in the way he desires without paying the fee. In Pechinski v. Astoria Federal
Savings and Loan Association, the consumers wanted to assign their loan to
another lender as part of a refinancing arrangement in order to save mortgage
recording tax.63 That privilege carried with it an assignment fee charged
by the assignor for transferring the old mortgage to the new lender.64
The consumers viewed this fee as part of the finance charge on the ground
that it was imposed “incident to, or as a condition of, the extension of
credit.”65
The lender imposed the assignment fee more than four years after the
original loan and the consumers could not provide any evidence that the
lender would not have made the loan in the absence of the consumers’

61. The finance charge includes “[d]iscounts for the purpose of inducing payment
by a means other than the use of credit.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(9) (2007); see also Walker v.
Wallace Auto Sales, Inc. 155 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that higher costs for
buying with credit qualified as finance charges); Knapp v. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc.,
245 F. Supp. 2d 841, 846 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (holding that hidden acquisition fees for
funding automobile purchases were finance charges because the consumer was required
to pay the fees); 7 KENNETH M. LAPINE, BANKING LAW § 152.08 (2007) (“[A]n escrow
fee normally imposed for both consumer credit and cash transactions is not a finance
charge.”).
62. A clear example of a charge not being assessed incident to the extension of
credit is when it is payable in a comparable cash transaction. See Mayberry v. Ememessay,
Inc. 201 F. Supp. 2d 687, 693–94 (W.D. Va. 2002) (finding that a fee to be paid to Department
of Motor Vehicles was not a finance charge); Hodges v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 786, 793 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that a processing fee was not a
finance charge where it was imposed on both cash and credit customers); 12 C.F.R. pt.
226 supp. 1, cmt. 4(a)-1; NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 3.6.5.2; cf. Hook
v. Baker, 352 F. Supp. 2d 839, 844 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (finding that a document preparation fee
was a finance charge when assessed against credit customers only).
63. 345 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 2003).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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promise to pay the fee. This element undermined the consumers’ position
that this fee was imposed incident to the extension of credit.66 The
creditor demanded an assignment fee following the consumers’ request
for the lender to assign the mortgage to another lending institution. Far
from extending credit, the lender was facilitating the transfer of the
outstanding documents, and not refinancing a transaction.67 In a sense,
therefore, the lender was terminating its involvement with the consumers
because it was extinguishing the debt. Thereafter, the consumers would
owe the debt to someone else.
It is a different proposition, however, if a consumer is required to pay
at the time of the loan for a subsequent assignment to a third party. In
that case, any assignment fee should be regarded as a finance charge.68
It seems, therefore, that when a fee is imposed pursuant to some
arrangement that follows the initial transaction, it is harder to show that
the fee is imposed incident to the extension of credit.69
In determining whether a charge is imposed as a condition of granting
credit, one must ask whether the lender required the consumer to pay the
charge before it would extend credit.70 If the charge is merely for the
accommodation of the consumer, it is easier to find that it is not part of
the finance charge. This situation usually arises, for example, with courier
fees, when the lender is anxious to have payoffs executed as promptly as
possible in order to avoid additional interest. When the consumer has a
choice in the matter, the charge is hardly one that is imposed as a
66. See id. at 82; see also Veale v. Citibank, F.S.B., 85 F.3d 577, 579 (11th Cir.
1996).
67. The consumers had contended that TILA required the creditor to disclose any
refinancing penalty. See Pechinski, 345 F.3d at 81. The regulation explains that a
refinancing occurs “when an existing obligation . . . is satisfied and replaced by a new
obligation undertaken by the same consumer.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.20 (2007). Although the
court referred only to the dictionary’s definition of “refinancing,” it stated that section
226.18 was consistent with that definition. Pechinski, 345 F.3d at 82.
68. See Brown v. Credithrift of Am. Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Brown), 106 B.R.
852, 858–59 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding that fee imposed at closing for contemplated
assignment constituted finance charge); Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612
A.2d 1130, 1132 (Conn. 1992) (holding that the fee charged for recording future
assignments was a finance charge); 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 4(e)-(1)(ii); NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 3.7.8.
69. Adamson v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 861 F.2d 63, 65–66 (4th Cir. 1988), overruled
on other grounds by Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990);
Stutman v. Chem. Bank, No. 94-Civ.-5013 (MBM), 1996 WL 539845, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 1996).
70. See First Acadiana Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 833 F.2d 548, 550 (5th
Cir. 1987); Yazzie v. Ray Vicker’s Special Cars, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1232
(D.N.M. 1998); Brodo v. Bankers Trust Co., 847 F. Supp. 353, 356–57 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
James Lockhart, Annotation, What Constitutes “Finance Charge” Under § 106(a) of the
Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (a)) or Applicable Regulations, 154 A.L.R.
FED. 431 (1999).
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condition of the extension of credit.71 Nevertheless, this does not mean
that the “incident to” and the “condition of” elements are one and the same.
In Veale v. Citibank, F.S.B., the courier fee was not incurred “incident to
the extension of credit” because the consumers could have refused the
Federal Express service and the creditor did not require it.72 This emphasis
on the voluntariness of the consumer’s conduct tends to have little effect
on the “incident to” prong, which for all intents and purposes is not
dependent upon the consumer’s approval of the charge. Therefore, even
if a lender does not impose a fee as a condition in a particular case, it
may still turn out to be “incident to” the grant of credit. That was certainly
the case in Pendleton v. American Title Brokers, where the consumer
obtained a loan by pawning her car title, but then the creditor leased the
car back to her at ten percent of the loan.73 Although the consumer did
not have to enter into the lease-back arrangement in order to get the loan
in the first place, the rental fee was nevertheless incident to the extension
of the underlying credit.74 It may fairly be said, therefore, that voluntariness
of the consumer’s action does not alone determine whether an item is a
part of the finance charge.75
A fee that is imposed as part of a transaction is likewise not necessarily a
part of the finance charge. For example, in Matlock v. Atomic Pawn,
Inc., a pawnbroker forced the consumer to pay a fee for a lost pawn
ticket before the consumer could redeem her property or refinance the
loan.76 The court concluded that the pawnbroker did not impose the fee

71. Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding
courier fee not imposed as condition of loan when title company made its own decision
as part of settling transaction); Scott v. Indymac Bank, FSB, No. 03-C-6489, 2005 WL
730961, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2005) (holding courier fee was not a finance charge if
not required or kept by lender).
72. 85 F.3d 577, 579 (11th Cir. 1996).
73. 754 F. Supp. 860, 861–62 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
74. Id. at 864. The consumer decided to take the lease-back of the car, but she did
not have to do so to obtain the loan. Furthermore, the rental rate was determined by the
amount of the loan, thus linking it to the extension of credit. See 12 C.F.R., pt. 226,
supp. 1, cmt. 17(c)(1)-18 (2007).
75. The Board discussed this concept of voluntariness when it amended Regulation
Z in 1996 to indicate when a creditor can exclude debt cancellation fees from the finance
charge. It did not want to exclude all voluntary charges from the finance charge and
expressed the view that “[i]n the case of debt cancellation agreements . . . the voluntary
nature of the arrangement does not alter the fact that debt cancellation coverage is a
feature of the loan affecting the total price paid for the credit.” Truth in Lending, 61 Fed.
Reg. 49,237, 49,239 (Sept. 19, 1996).
76. No. 3:04-CV-323, 2005 WL 2456963, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2005).
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“as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit.”77 The
consumer had to pay the fee only because she could not produce the
ticket at maturity, and the pawnbroker imposed it only because of the
additional record keeping involved to accommodate lost tickets.78 There
was no link between the fee and the extension of credit because the
consumer did not have to refinance her loan when she could not produce
her ticket. This was akin to a charge for “actual unanticipated late
payment, for exceeding a credit limit, or for delinquency, default, or a
similar occurrence.”79
III. TIMING AND FORM OF DISCLOSURES
A. Keeping the Disclosures
Because Truth in Lending is a disclosure statute, a creditor is expected
to make the necessary disclosures before consummation of a credit
transaction.80 There is nothing unusual about that. After all, the objective
of Truth in Lending is to make sure that the creditor informs the
consumer about the essential details of the credit transaction before the
consumer is contractually bound,81 and that magical moment of commitment
is determined not by Truth in Lending, but instead by state law.82
The regulation requires the creditor to give the consumer the disclosures
in a form that the consumer may keep.83 The Official Staff Commentary
explains that this requirement does not require a creditor to give the
consumer two separate copies of the disclosure statement before
77.
78.

Id. at *4.
See id.; see also Pawn Broker’s Lost Ticket Fee Is Not a Finance Charge,
CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., Nov. 2005, at 5.
79. Matlock, 2005 WL 2456963, at *4 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2)). Note
here that the defendant imposed the fee only if the consumer could not produce the
ticket, a contingency that had nothing to do with the extension of credit. A consumer
may find himself in a similar situation if he pays late or becomes delinquent. See 12
C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2) (2007).
80. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b) (2007).
81. TILA expresses the purpose of Truth in Lending in this way:
It is the purpose of [Truth in Lending] to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the
various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit,
and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and
credit card practices.
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
82. The Official Staff Commentary explains that “[w]hen a contractual obligation
on the consumer’s part is created is a matter to be determined under applicable law;
Regulation Z does not make this determination.” 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 2(a)(13)-1
(2007). Regulation Z defines “consummation” as “the time that a consumer becomes
contractually obligated on a credit transaction.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13) (2007).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a) (2007).
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consummation.84 It is enough for the creditor to give the consumer a
copy of the contract with the disclosures to read and sign, and then give
the consumer a copy to keep for himself once the consumer is obligated.85
The Commentary advises that it is not enough for a creditor to show the
consumer the document containing the disclosures before the consumer
signs on the dotted line.86 The consumer must be able to take possession
of the document and review it.87 But the difficulty lies in ensuring that
the consumer has the opportunity to do exactly as the Commentary
suggests. If the consumer has before him a single copy of a document
with the disclosures, he may be in doubt about how to proceed. If he
signs the document and the creditor then gives him a copy, it can fairly
be said that he had a copy of the disclosures before the transaction was
consummated. But that is not all that Truth in Lending requires. The
disclosures must be in a form that the consumer may keep.88 If the
creditor presents the copy for the consumer’s signature, intending to give
the consumer an unsigned copy for the consumer’s records once the
transaction is consummated, it is questionable whether the creditor has
met all the disclosure requirements. It is true that in this scenario, the
consumer will have preconsummation disclosures, but it is not altogether
clear that he will have them at the time and in a form that he may keep.
This was the problem that confronted the court in Polk v. Crown Auto,
Inc.89 In Polk the creditor explained the credit terms to the consumer,
but did not give them to him in writing in a form that he could keep
before consummation. The court thus had to decide whether the creditor
had to make the disclosures before consummation in a form that the
consumer could keep, or whether the creditor could make such disclosures
orally before consummation and give the consumer written disclosures
after consummation. The creditor thought that it could make disclosures
in any form prior to consummation, but that it had to make written disclosures

84. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007).
85. See id. The Official Staff Commentary gives an example of how this works:
“A creditor gives a consumer a multiple-copy form containing a credit agreement and
TILA disclosures. The consumer reviews and signs the form and returns it to the creditor,
who separates the copies and gives one copy to the consumer to keep. The creditor has
satisfied the disclosure requirement.” Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a).
89. 221 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 2000).
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in a form that the consumer could keep only after consummation.90 It was a
good try, but the court would not accept the creditor’s argument that
sections 226.17(a)(1) and 226.17(b) referred to different disclosures.91
The court accepted the plain meaning of the regulation to be that the
creditor must give written disclosures in the form dictated by subsection
(a)(1) at the time identified in subsection (b).92 This was a logical result,
given the congressional intent to promote meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that consumers can assess their options in the marketplace.93
The creditor in Polk therefore complied with one part of the regulation
while ignoring the other. The preconsummation presentation of the disclosure
form to the consumer did not really give him any time to reflect on the
terms of the transaction. One can only imagine the scene as the parties
prepared to conclude the sale. The creditor probably wanted to make
sure that the consumer understood the details of the loan and set about in
earnest to explain every nuance of the deal. The terms must have been
in writing; if not, the creditor would not have had a script with which to
operate. No one could therefore accuse the creditor of not making written
disclosures. It goes without saying that if a consumer has to sign the sales
contract containing the Truth in Lending disclosures, then the consumer
will have the disclosures before him, even if only for one second before
consummation. But that is all that the regulation requires in subsection
(b). Having satisfied that element, the creditor must then ensure that it
has given disclosures to the consumer in a form that the consumer may
keep.94 If the creditor expects the consumer to return the signed document
to it before it returns a copy to the consumer, then one can hardly say
that the creditor has satisfied all requirements before consummation.
A determination about a creditor’s disclosure obligation depends in
large measure on who determines whether the consumer may keep the

90. See id. at 692.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
94. Having an opportunity to read the disclosures is not the same thing as having
an opportunity to keep them. The court in Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.,
seemed more concerned with the consumer’s reading opportunity. See Nigh v. Koons
Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 535, 548 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d, 319 F.3d 119
(4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004). The consumer in Nigh
signed the documents immediately because he thought he would lose the chance to buy
the truck he wanted. See id. So it did not matter to him whether or not he could keep a
copy of the disclosures. Some courts have viewed the “may keep” element in section
226.17(a) as not subject to any preconsummation requirement. See Padin v. Oyster Point
Dodge, 397 F. Supp. 2d 712, 722 (E.D. Va. 2005); Haun v. Don Mealey Imports, Inc.,
285 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 2003). This interpretation takes the sting out of
the requirement that the consumer should be left free to review the disclosures at his own
pace.
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credit document before consummation.95 The expectation attributed to
the regulatory language does not reflect the reality of everyday transactions.
Surely a creditor does not anticipate that a consumer who has one copy
of the credit document in front of him for signature will suddenly call for
a delay in proceedings to contemplate the possibility of getting a better
deal elsewhere, even if he understands the elements of the transaction that is
near consummation. The “may keep” language should carry more weight
than the Official Staff Commentary gives it.96 But the Commentary is not
alone in underestimating the importance of that phrase. In Diaz v. Joe
Rizza Ford, Inc., for example, the dealer used a three-copy form for the
transaction.97 The consumer signed the top copy and the dealer then gave
her that copy while retaining the others.98 The court saw no meaningful
distinction between separating the copies before or after the consumer
signed the document.99 In the court’s view, the consumer could have left
with the unsigned document if she desired.100 But it is clear that the
creditor did not intend the consumer to keep the retail installment
contract containing those disclosures. It was after all a three-copy form
that contemplated a further exchange between the parties. The consumer
only found out after signing what she was going to keep after consummation.
Once the consumer signed, the creditor found it convenient to let her
have her copy, without any limitation on her review. By then, of course,
she was already committed to the transaction and there was no doubt
then about her ability to keep what she had.101
95. Some courts tend to reject a connection between the form and timing requirements
of Regulation Z. See Spearman v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 312 F.3d 848, 851
(7th Cir. 2002); Nigh, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Queen v. Lynch Jewelers, LLC, 55 P.3d
914, 919–20 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
96. The Official Staff Commentary makes the point: “The disclosure requirement
is satisfied if the creditor gives a copy of the document containing the unexecuted credit
contract and disclosures to the consumer to read and sign; and the consumer receives a
copy to keep at the time the consumer becomes obligated.” 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1,
cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007). It is arguable that the Commentary distinguishes between “reading”
the document and “keeping” the document. The regulation requires the consumer to
have the opportunity to keep the document before consummation of the transaction and
not merely at the time of consummation. See id. § 226.17(b).
97. 210 F. Supp. 2d 959, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 961.
100. Id.
101. The Diaz court was satisfied that the plaintiff “was informed, and was
protected because she took away her copy.” Id. at 960. But the taking by itself does not
satisfy the requirement that the lender must satisfy the “may keep” element before
consummation of the transaction. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a), (b) (2007). It is advantageous to
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The Diaz approach indicates that a creditor will meet the disclosure
requirements if it shows the consumer the disclosures on the retail
installment contract before the consumer signs, because the consumer
always has a choice to defer consummation by leaving with the contract
in hand.102 If the disclosure obligation ends there, it is questionable
whether the language “in a form that the consumer may keep” has any
room to do its work. The drafters could have achieved this objective by
simply requiring the creditor to make disclosures in writing to the
consumer before consummation of the transaction, and the creditor could
then comply merely by presenting a form to the consumer for signature.
After all, once the disclosures are there in the contract document, the
consumer should have nothing to complain about as long as he gets
something to take away with him after the transaction.103 Therefore, in
order to give full measure to the additional language in the section, it is
reasonable to impose an obligation on the creditor to put the consumer in
possession and control of his own copy of the document before, not
after, consummation, so that the consumer will understand that his
review of the document is an entirely separate event that may or may not
lead to consummation.104

the creditor to keep together all copies of the contract document containing the
disclosures. It creates an opportunity for the creditor to shorten the ceremonial part
of the transaction, while assuring the consumer that he will soon get a copy of the
document. In Cannon v. Metro Ford, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2002),
the consumer alleged that the dealer deliberately covered up the disclosures with his hand
and retained physical control of the documents. The consumer successfully resisted the
dealer’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 1330. The objection to separation of the consumer’s
copy before any signing occurs simply contributes to the lender’s inability to emphasize
the consumer’s right to keep the copy that is in the consumer’s hands. See also
Cunningham v. H.A.S., Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1168–69 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (denying
summary judgment for dealer because of consumer’s allegations that dealer covered up
the disclosure form that consumer signed).
102. See Diaz, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
103. In Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 321 (W.D. Mich. 2000),
the consumer signed the contract containing the disclosures, but did not get a copy until
some weeks later. The court held that the consumers did not get a copy in a form that
they could keep. Id. at 337. The Diaz approach would dictate a finding that the dealer
had complied with the disclosure requirement. Following this interpretation, one would
be unable to find any violation even if the dealer never gave the consumer a copy,
because the preconsummation activity surrounding the consumer’s signing would take
for granted that the consumer could always walk away with the document if he wanted
to. See Diaz, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
104. The court said it best in Walters v. First State Bank, 134 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781
(W.D. Va. 2001): “Surely, the requirement of Regulation Z, as interpreted in Polk, that
the consumer be given written disclosures, in a form that she can keep, means more than
that the consumer must be shown the disclosures on the original credit contract prior to
signing it.” See also Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121, 125 (W.D.
Mich. 2002); Lozada, 197 F.R.D. at 336–37.
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In Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., the court read Polk as
dealing only with the timing requirements, but not with the form of the
disclosures.105 The Nigh court saw no objection to the disclosures being
made in the retail installment contract between the parties, and to support its
position it harkened back to Polk on the ground that the court there did
not see any problem with the disclosures being made in that way.106
The Nigh court thought it was unclear from the facts in Polk whether
the sales contract contained all the proper disclosures when the parties
signed it.107 This characterization of the transaction allowed the Nigh
court to focus on timing at the expense of form, thus leaving the
impression that the Polk court had no objection to the inclusion of the
disclosures in the sales contract. It is clear from Polk that the creditor
“explained” the credit terms to the consumer, the parties then signed the
sales contract with those terms included therein, and the creditor then
gave the consumer a copy of the contract.108 Significantly, the creditor
in Polk conceded that it had not made the disclosures to the consumer
before consummation in a form that the consumer could keep.109 This
concession flowed no doubt from the creditor’s recognition of its
preconsummation, oral explanation of the credit terms as the true moment
of disclosure. Having met its obligation to make its preconsummation
disclosures pursuant to section 226.17(b), the creditor then had to worry
about section 226.17(a) concerning the need for written disclosures in a
form that the consumers could keep.
The creditor had hoped that the court in Polk would read subsection
(a) independently of subsection (b). In this way, a creditor could make
preconsummation disclosures which did not have to be in writing, as
long as it made written disclosures later in a form that the consumer
could keep. This was not to be, for the court decided that “written
disclosure in the form specified in subpart (a) must be provided to the
consumer at the time specified in subpart (b).”110 This formulation left
105. 143 F. Supp. 2d 535, 548 (2001), aff’d 319 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on
other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Polk v. Crown Auto, Inc., 221 F.3d 691, 691 (4th Cir. 2000).
109. See id. at 692.
110. Id. The court followed the plain meaning of the regulation. Id. The plain
meaning rule is explained this way: “[The rule] generally means when the language of
the statute is clear and not unreasonable or illogical in its operation, the court may not go
outside the statute to give it a different meaning.” 2A SINGER, supra note 50, § 46:01.
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no doubt that this was more than a timing problem. The court was
uncomfortable with the creditor’s strategy of presenting the sales contract
containing the disclosures for the consumer’s signature after the creditor
had gone through the ritual of an oral explanation. The preconsummation
explanation seemed to constitute disclosure in some form, but the
disappointment was that the consumer had nothing to take away with
him.111 The writing requirement came later, but in the creditor’s scheme
of things, the disclosures had already been made. When the creditor
presented the completed contract for signature, there was no inkling at
that moment that the parties contemplated a second opportunity for the
consumer’s reflection about the terms that the creditor had already spent
time explaining. Even the creditor admitted as much in Polk, for the
question for the court was whether, in light of the creditor’s concession,
the creditor had nevertheless satisfied Regulation Z by making the original
disclosures orally and then following them up with disclosures in a
form that the consumer could keep after consummation.
B. Separating the Copies Before or After Consummation
One court has taken the view that “there is no meaningful distinction
between separation of a consumer’s copy from the other copies of a credit
contract containing the TILA disclosures before or after signature.”112 It
is easy to disagree with that statement if one thinks that the Truth in
Lending scheme requires meaningful disclosure.113 If it does not matter
whether the creditor drives home the point that the consumer has his
own copy of the disclosures for preconsummation review, then one will
find no meaningful distinction in separating the consumer’s copy. It
would be acceptable, therefore, for the creditor to remain passive and
merely hand over all the copies to the consumer in a perfunctory manner
for his signature, without any fanfare and with the objective of bringing
the transaction to a prompt conclusion. It is only when the creditor gives
the consumer the signed copy that the consumer will understand that he
has a copy in a form that he may keep. It is open to question whether this
is a satisfactory solution to the lurking ambiguity when a creditor says
nothing about the consumer’s right to keep the unsigned document.114
111. This is why the “disclosures” mentioned in the timing paragraph (b) must be
construed as the same “disclosures” mentioned in paragraph (a)(1). Compare 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.17(a)(1) (2007), with id. § 226.17(b).
112. Queen v. Lynch Jewelers, LLC, 55 P.3d 914, 920–21 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
113. The purpose of Truth in Lending is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
114. If the creditor is deemed to fulfill its obligation at that point, and the consumer
then signs the multicopy document, the creditor should be able to keep all the copies for

632

GRIFFITH.DOC

[VOL. 44: 611, 2007]

11/15/2007 8:59:09 AM

Truth in Lending
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The Commentary’s approach, relied upon by several cases, is to place
the burden on the consumer to show that the creditor will not allow him
to leave with the document if he decides not to sign it. In other words,
there is a presumption that as a matter of principle the creditor will not
object to the consumer’s taking away the unsigned copy for review.
There is no good reason why this should be a matter of conjecture,
particularly in light of the congressional objective to make the consumer
keenly aware of the terms of the transaction that he is considering.
Although a court should give deference to the administrative agency that
is charged with enforcing a statute,115 the Official Staff Commentary
itself observes that “[i]t is not sufficient for the creditor merely to show
the consumer the document containing the disclosures before the consumer
signs and becomes obligated.”116 But the Commentary goes on to emphasize
that the consumer must be free “to take possession of and review the
document in its entirety before signing.”117 The relevant inquiry, therefore,
should be about the consumer’s freedom to take possession of the
document. Surely the creditor should use the document to alert the consumer
to the fact that it intends to give the consumer free rein in deciding
whether to move forward with the transaction. The creditor can achieve
this not only by giving the consumer his own copy prior to signing, but
also by including language that is more conspicuous than any other item
in the disclosures that confirms the consumer’s freedom to keep the
document for review before signing it.118
itself and not be obligated to give the consumer anything. The “may keep” requirement
applies to the preconsummation period, because once the consumer signs, he is committed.
In a 2002 revision of the Commentary, the Board explained that “[t]he disclosure
requirement is satisfied if the creditor gives a copy of the document containing the
unexecuted credit contract and the disclosures to the consumer to read and sign; and the
consumer receives a copy to keep at the time the consumer becomes obligated.” 12
C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007). The consumer should have a copy to keep
before he becomes obligated. Courts have generally emphasized that the consumer
received a copy of the disclosures after consummation of the transaction. See Spearman
v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 312 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2002); Randolph v. Joe
Holland Chevrolet, Inc., No. Civ.A. 2:00-1132, 2005 WL 2428164, at *4 (S.D. W. Va.
Sept. 30, 2002). This is not really important if the preconsummation events determine
whether the consumer has a right to keep a copy of the disclosures.
115. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) (mandating
that courts give deference to the Board’s regulations when interpreting TILA).
116. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007).
117. Id.
118. There is nothing unusual about this kind of disclosure. For example, a creditor
must disclose the “annual percentage rate” and the “finance charge” more conspicuously
than other disclosures except the creditor’s identity. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(2) (2007).
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The disclosure obligation raises another question about consummation:
When does it occur? The regulation defines consummation as “the time
that a consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction”119
and state law determines when such an obligation arises.120 The regulation
identifies the consumer’s commitment as the relevant event, because that
is the time when the consumer is subject to the hazards of the creditor’s
failure to comply with the disclosure requirements. It is then that the creditor
has it within its power to bind the consumer to the terms of the contract,
and so the consumer should be advised about those terms before signing the
contract, even though the lender’s commitment may come later.121 If it
were otherwise, a creditor could give a consumer inaccurate disclosures,
have the consumer commit himself, and then revise the disclosures
before closing the transaction.122
C. The Contingent Contract
There is a variation on the consummation theme that merits attention.
Sometimes the contract between the parties is contingent upon the
consumer’s success in obtaining financing. That was the situation in Bragg
v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., where the purchase contracts contained not
only a condition precedent relative to financing, but also a provision that
neither party would be bound until the credit terms were approved by the
parties.123 Despite this language, the Eleventh Circuit held that “in a financing
agreement containing a condition precedent where the condition of obtaining
financing is within the exclusive control of the seller and third-party
lender, consummation occurs when the consumer signs the contract.”124
This decision was a little surprising, given the Commentary’s position
that state law determines when a consumer becomes contractually obligated.125
In this case, neither party was contractually bound under state law until
the dealer obtained financing for the consumer.126 Nevertheless, the
court found that consummation had occurred, because it rejected the
plain meaning of the regulation in order to avoid a result that it thought

119. Id. § 226.2(a)(13).
120. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 2(a)(13)-1 (2007).
121. See Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 319 F.3d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 2003),
rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004); Bryson v. Bank of N.Y., 584 F. Supp. 1306,
1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Madewell v. Marietta Dodge, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 286, 288–89 (N.D.
Ga. 1980).
122. Nigh, 319 F.3d at 124.
123. 374 F.3d 1060, 1067 (11th Cir. 2004).
124. Id. at 1068.
125. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 2(a)(13)-1 (2007).
126. See Bragg, 374 F.3d at 1067.
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would be inconsistent with the policies of Truth in Lending.127 In doing
so, however, the court conferred a role on Truth in Lending not intended
by Congress. The court’s approach implied that TILA created substantive
rights and duties for the parties, and that the court did not have to look to
state law for a determination of the parties’ contractual obligations. It is
difficult to see how else the court could have arrived at its conclusion
about the consumer’s commitment.
The court was worried that a creditor would be protected in giving
disclosures after the consumer had signed a conditional financing agreement.
But disclosures that follow such a signing do not follow consummation
if state law like that in Bragg is to be respected. The disclosures precede
consummation because the consumer is not yet bound to the terms of the
arrangement.128 There is something to be said for giving a consumer an
opportunity to consider all financing options. But in trying to do so in
Bragg, the Eleventh Circuit ignored both the Official Staff Commentary
and the state law on consummation.129 This was not an argument
about whether the consumer had preconsummation disclosures that he
could keep, but rather whether consummation had occurred at all. If the
parties are not to be bound until a condition is fulfilled, then there is no

127. See id. at 1068 (citing Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.
1988)). While it is true that a statute should not be read literally when that would run
counter to its purposes, 2A SINGER, supra note 50, § 46:07, the court’s quarrel should not
have been with Regulation Z, but rather with Florida law that recognizes the effect of a
condition precedent. Truth in Lending did not confer any substantive rights on the
consumer with respect to consummation. Allowing a lender to give disclosures after the
consumer signs an agreement that is subject to a condition precedent will not create any
more or less problems than allowing a lender to give the disclosures immediately before
the consumer signs an agreement that has no conditions. See Disclosures Required Though
Consumer’s Signature Does Not Contractually Obligate Him, CONSUMER CREDIT &
TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., Aug. 2004, at 4.
128. The focus must be on the consumer’s commitment. A distinction must be
drawn between a condition precedent to a lender’s obligation and that relating to a
consumer’s obligation. See Gaona v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th
Cir. 2003); Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 319 F.3d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 2003),
rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004); O’Brien v. Aames Funding Corp., 374 F.
Supp. 2d 764, 767 (D. Minn. 2005); 10 LAPINE, supra note 61, § 174.02.
129. The Official Staff Commentary stipulates that “[w]hen a contractual obligation
on the consumer’s part is created is a matter to be determined under applicable law;
Regulation Z does not make this determination.” 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 2(a)(13)-1.
Under Florida law, neither party was liable under the contract until the dealer had
assigned the contract to a third party. See Bragg, 374 F.3d at 1067; King v. King Motor
Co. of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., 900 So. 2d 619, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Huskamp
Motor Co. v. Hebdon, 104 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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consummation.130 If a creditor is allowed to give disclosures after the
consumer signs a conditional contract, it will not impair the consumer’s
chance to compare other financing opportunities. Under present conditions,
a creditor can offer its disclosures to the consumer up until the very
moment that a consumer signs a binding document. So, applying the
plain meaning rule in this context does not put the consumer in any
worse position than with an unconditional contract.131 If a consumer
will not have an adequate opportunity to consider competing financing
offers from other lenders under the conditional arrangement, then one
can say the same thing about the normal financing transaction. The
creditor may have little or no time for reflection in either event. The
objective is not to change the transaction when consummation occurs,
but rather to ensure that the consumer knows that consummation is
imminent and that he is agreeing to the terms he sees in front of him.
It is understandable that the court in Bragg132 relied on the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., which
involved an unfunded financing agreement. In Nigh, the consumer
committed himself to the transaction and all that remained was for the
dealer to sign off at its sole discretion if it could make an assignment to a
lender.133 The completion of the transaction remained solely within the
dealer’s control and did not affect the consumer’s commitment. The
consumer’s signature signaled his obligation to perform and the consumer
could not thereafter change the financing terms even though the dealer
had not yet agreed to the contract.134 The situation in Bragg was a little
different in that neither party was bound until both parties approved the
terms of credit.135 The Bragg court did not reject the role of the condition
130. It has been said that “[a] court in construing an unambiguous statute must view
the law as it is and not as it might wish it to be.” 2A SINGER, supra note 50, § 46:02.
The court in Bragg did not really explain how the plain meaning of the Truth in Lending
statute was at variance with the policy of the statute. It should have ignored the plain
meaning only if the result produced by applying the plain meaning rule was inconsistent
with the policies underlying the statute. See id. § 46:02. The court’s quarrel was really
with the state law governing conditions. Truth in Lending governs disclosure and not the
time when the consumer’s commitment attaches. See Disclosures Required Though
Consumer’s Signature Does Not Contractually Obligate Him, supra note 127, at 5.
131. See Disclosures Required Though Consumer’s Signature Does Not Contractually
Obligation Him, supra note 127, at 5. In the same way that a creditor can give the
consumer disclosures shortly before the consumer signs the documents, so too a
consumer can use the time between the signing of the conditional documents and the
funding of the transaction to engage in some comparison shopping.
132. Bragg, 374 F.3d at 1066.
133. See Nigh, 319 F.3d at 122.
134. The court emphasized that “Nigh, having signed the contracts and turned them
over to Koons Buick, was committed to the transaction and obliged to perform upon
counter-signature by Koons Buick.” Id.
135. See Bragg, 374 F.3d at 1067.
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precedent under Florida law, but instead rejected a reading of Regulation
Z that it thought was inconsistent with Truth in Lending’s goals.136
When the Fourth Circuit returned to the consummation issue in Gibson v.
LTD, Inc.,137 it remained true to the principles embraced in Nigh, while
expressing satisfaction that the Bragg court had applied the Nigh court’s
approach to consummation.138 In Gibson, the consumer could cancel the
contract only “‘if the seller agree[d] or for legal cause.’”139 The document
left no doubt that the consumer was bound and that he could avoid his
obligation only if the dealer was unable to obtain outside financing “on
terms acceptable to [the dealer].”140 Unlike the contracts in Bragg, the
contract in Gibson did not give the consumer any power to approve the
financing that the dealer was seeking, and therefore there was a stronger
argument in favor of consummation. The consumer could be released
from liability only with the dealer’s consent, or if no financing was
available on the dealer’s terms.
IV. THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION
A. Electing Not to Cancel
One of the important rights that Truth in Lending confers on a consumer
is the right to rescind a credit transaction in which the lender acquires a
security interest in the consumer’s principal dwelling.141 The consumer
must exercise that right before midnight of the third business day after
consummation of the transaction, delivery of notice of the right of rescission,
or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever comes last.142 If the lender
fails to meet its disclosure obligations, the consumer’s right of rescission
will continue for up to three years after consummation of the
136. See id. at 1068. The court’s approach puts the emphasis not on consummation,
but rather on the consumer’s execution of the document. A shift from consummation to
signing may be desirable, but it flies in the face of the regulation’s definition of
“consummation.” See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13) (2007). It is the time that the consumer
becomes contractually obligated that matters.
137. 434 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2006).
138. See id. at 282.
139. Id. at 278 (alteration in original).
140. Id. at 282.
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (2007).
142. Id. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). Regulation Z defines “material
disclosures” as “the required disclosures of the annual percentage rate, the finance charge,
the amount financed, the total of payments, the payment schedule, and the disclosures
and limitations referred to in § 226.32 (c) and (d).” 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) n.48.
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transaction.143 A lender can be quite surprised when a consumer rescinds
long after the lender thinks that a transaction has been consummated.
Sometimes a lender will seek reassurance that the consumer will not
rescind by having the consumer sign a statement to that effect at the
closing, postdating it at the same time to give some legitimacy to the
document.144 After all, the consumer only has three days in the first instance
to rescind if everything is in order, and the consumer’s contemporaneous
election not to cancel serves as a protection for the lender that wants to
wrap up a transaction without having to worry that the consumer may
change his mind. Nevertheless, a lender is obligated to disclose “clearly
and conspicuously” to the consumer the right of rescission and the
procedure for realizing that right, and this premature election not to
cancel usually runs afoul of this requirement.145
That was the situation in Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Company, when the
consumer signed a separate statement acknowledging her receipt of the
notice of the right to rescind, but also at the same time confirming her
election not to cancel the transaction.146 The ploy was destined to fail,
for the court recognized that the lender’s presentation of the so-called
waiver form on the day of the transaction was a pure contradiction of the
rationale for the three-day rescission period.147 It deprived the consumer
of the opportunity to reflect on the transaction. It seemed that the premature
election cancelled out the acknowledgment of the notice of the right to
rescind and the placement of these two competing messages could only
have confused the consumer.148 She may have thought that this was just
part of the ritual and that she had to sign the election notice if she hoped
to consummate the transaction.
This election mechanism does not really give a lender any advantage.
A lender may think that it is expediting the transaction, but the borrower’s
certificate of nonrescission cannot be recognized as a waiver because
Regulation Z sanctions a waiver only when the consumer has a bona fide
personal emergency that requires an immediate extension of credit.149 In
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3).
144. See Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 1994);
Wiggins v. Avco Fin. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95 (D.D.C. 1999); Apaydin v. Citibank
Fed. Sav. Bank (In re Apaydin), 201 B.R. 716, 718–19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
145. For example, if the election form states that the rescission period has expired,
this is inconsistent with the lender’s simultaneous disclosure about the three-day rescission
period. See Wiggins, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 96; Apaydin, 201 B.R. at 723; Mount v. LaSalle
Bank Lake View, 926 F. Supp. 759, 765 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
146. Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1145.
147. Id. at 1147.
148. Id. at 1146.
149. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(e) (2007). The consumer’s waiver must describe the
emergency underlying the waiver and the consumer cannot use printed forms for the
purpose. Id. § 226.23(e)(1). This is intended to avoid abusive practices, while at the
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that event, the consumer must describe the emergency in a dated,
handwritten statement.150 In Rodash, the lender presented a preprinted
form containing boilerplate language that had no relation to the
borrower’s financial situation, and that was not designed to drive home
the seriousness of the decision about a waiver.151 If the objective is to
secure a quick disbursement of funds once the three-day period expires,
the lender can do so by having the consumer certify that he has not
cancelled the transaction, and then simultaneously disbursing the funds
to him.152 The Rodash scenario did not leave any room for the borrower
to change her mind, and if perchance she had some reservations about the
transaction the day after she signed, she might have been deterred from
taking any action, knowing full well what she had signed. These contrasting
statements, both appearing on the same page, did not add up to clear
disclosure.153
A creditor’s placement of an acknowledgment of receipt of the notice
on the same page as a certificate of confirmation that the consumer has
not rescinded does not automatically lead to a violation. After Rodash, the
Eleventh Circuit had another opportunity to consider a similar scenario
in Smith v. Highland Bank.154 This time the notice of the right to cancel
contained not only the consumer’s acknowledgment of receipt, but also a
certificate of confirmation relating to noncancellation of the transaction.155
Although the certificate of confirmation and the acknowledgment of
receipt were on the same page, they were in separate paragraphs and

same time making allowance for genuine cases of emergency. See 1 PANNABECKER,
supra note 48, ¶ 6.03[5].
150. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(e)(1); see also Mills v. Home Equity Group, Inc., 871
F. Supp. 1482, 1485–86 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the attempted release of Truth in
Lending claims as part of settlement claim was ineffective to waive right of rescission).
151. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1145 & n.2.
152. The lender in Morris v. The Lomas & Nettleton Co. succeeded with its quick
disbursement strategy. 708 F. Supp. 1198, 1206 (D. Kan. 1989). The court recognized
that “[t]he purpose of signing the election not to rescind portion of the form prior to the
expiration of the three days was to allow the defendant to disburse the funds quickly after
the expiration of the three-day period.” Id. The court did not recognize the consumer’s
signing as a waiver, but merely as a predated statement of an election not to rescind,
because the lender disbursed the funds after the three-day period had expired. Id.
153. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1147. Both TILA and Regulation Z require the creditor
to make clear and conspicuous disclosure of the consumer’s right to rescind. See 15
U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1).
154. 108 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1997).
155. Id. at 1326.
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were to be signed separately.156 However, in Smith the form clearly
indicated that the consumers were not to sign the confirmation until the
three-day rescission period had elapsed, and the certificate of confirmation
was dated several days after the acknowledgment of receipt.157 This
arrangement was very different from that in Rodash, where the
consumer signed the election not to cancel on the same date as the loan
closing, thus leaving no doubt that she wanted to waive her right to
rescind ahead of time.158 Furthermore, in Smith there were provisions for
two separate signatures, one acknowledging the consumer’s receipt of the
notice of her rescission right, and the other indicating that the consumer
had not rescinded.159 In Rodash, on the other hand, the consumer’s single
signature covered both the acknowledgment and the confirmation.160
Therefore, although a lender could remove all doubt about the relationship
between an acknowledgment of receipt and a confirmation of nonrescission
by dealing with them in separate statements and postponing presentation
of the latter until the expiration of the rescission period, the court in Smith
made the point that it was unnecessary to extend Rodash to accommodate
that situation.161
The Smith court seemed to be on the right track in holding that the use
of a form like the certificate of confirmation involved there was not a
violation per se.162 But when the transaction goes beyond that by requiring
the consumer’s signature in advance of the expiration of the rescission
period, then the creditor is sowing the seeds of confusion by creating
doubts in the consumer’s mind about the right of rescission. It is a
contradiction in terms for the creditor to give a notice about rescission
and then to seek the consumer’s advance election not to rescind.
In Adams v. Nationscredit Financial Services Corp., the confirmation
form warranted that “more than three business days [had] passed since

156. Id. at 1327.
157. Id.
158. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1146.
159. See Smith, 108 F.3d at 1327.
160. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1146.
161. The Smith court exercised restraint in favor of the lender this time around as a
reaction to the seemingly harsh Rodash decision that characterized certain routine fees as
part of the finance charge. Following Rodash, Congress gave its own reaction to the
harshness of Rodash by enacting certain amendments to the TILA. See Truth in Lending
Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271. Congress overrode a number
of judicial decisions with these amendments, but it did not deal specifically with an
election not to cancel. One might surmise that its failure to respond to that issue
indicated its willingness to go along with the Rodash ruling on that point, but
nevertheless the Eleventh Circuit deemed it necessary to restrict Rodash to its facts, thus
sending a message that it wanted to exercise restraint in light of the congressional
reaction to Rodash. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.4.3.8.
162. See Smith, 108 F.3d at 1327 n.1.
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receipt of the Notice of Right to Cancel . . .” and further warranted that
the consumer had not rescinded the transaction.163 Although the statement
was untrue, consumers would still be confused about whether they still
had a right to rescind. This so-called warranty of no rescission that
accompanied the notice of the right of rescission could hardly be seen to
promote the clarity that the statute demanded. In Adams, the lender’s
actions were no less blameworthy simply because the confirmation did
not bear a date. The form did not even provide a line for the date. That
missing element only served to accentuate the confusion that would
ensue from the document.164
This practice of having a consumer sign both forms at the closing is
objectionable because a consumer may be misled into thinking that he
can no longer rescind once he has signed the confirmation of nonrescission.165
The form that a lender provides to accommodate a consumer’s election
not to cancel is both “objectively false and internally inconsistent.”166 A
lender usually places the confirmation and the notice of the right of
rescission in the same document to produce a kind of waiver for the
consumer. Of course, Regulation Z prescribes the format for a waiver and
this mechanism is not an effective substitute for the formal requirements
of a true waiver.167 Nevertheless, the proximity of the two different
statements leaves the consumer with the impression that he must sign on
the dotted line if he wants to consummate the transaction. This is what the
creditor relies on to persuade the consumer to complete the transaction.
Once a consumer rescinds a transaction, he cannot thereafter revive it
by merely signing a “notice of confirmation” that is intended to reflect
the parties’ interest in consummating a new loan. In Chapman v. Mortgage

163. 351 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
164. The court observed that “[t]he average borrower who was asked to sign such a
statement at the closing would be confused about whether he was still entitled to a threeday ‘cooling off’ period.” Id.
165. See Rodrigues v. Members Mortgage Co., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 202, 209 (D.
Mass. 2004); Latham v. Residential Loan Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 03-C-7094, 2004 WL
1093315, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2004); Wiggins v. Avco Fin. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 90,
96–97 (D.D.C. 1999).
166. Wiggins, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 96. It was contradictory for the lender to tell the
borrower that the “cooling off” period had passed and that she could no longer rescind.
See id.
167. Regulation Z stresses the significance of a waiver by requiring the signature of
all consumers who are entitled to rescind. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(e) (2007). For example, if
two spouses use their home as collateral, both must sign the waiver. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226,
supp. 1, cmt. 23(e)-2 (2007); see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.2.9.1.
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One Corp., the lender thought that the consumer’s notice of confirmation
had done the trick, but the court held that TILA made no provision for
the revival of a rescinded loan.168 In any event, the postrescission
discussions between the parties about a new loan did not lead to any
written documentation, and because the new loan contemplated different
terms, it could hardly be a revival of the old loan.169 Furthermore, even
if a common law revival was possible, the parties could accomplish it
only by mutual consent, and there was still work to be done on the new
terms.170
Nor did this “revival” concept work for the lender in another context.
In Stump v. WMC Mortgage Corp., the consumer accepted the loan proceeds
after rescinding the loan transaction and the lender argued that the consumer
should be estopped from enforcing his rescission.171 The thinking was
that the consumer’s conduct in accepting the proceeds had ratified or
“re-awakened” the loan and the consumer could not be heard thereafter
to rescind the loan.172 But the court in Stump recognized the consumer’s
rescission as voiding the contract, making ratification thereof legally
impossible.173
If a creditor receives a rescission notice from a consumer, the creditor
is well advised not to ignore it. If the creditor does not agree with the
consumer’s rescission, its best course of action is to bring its own
lawsuit to settle the matter.174 This approach would certainly avoid the
possibility of a forfeiture resulting from the creditor’s inaction.175 After

168.
169.
170.

359 F. Supp. 2d 831, 833 (E.D. Mo. 2005).
See id.
A rescinded contract can be revived only by mutual consent. See 13 SARAH
JENKINS, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 67.8 (2003); 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 432

HOWARD
(1999).
171. No. Civ.A. 02-326, 2005 WL 645238, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2005).
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. See Abel v. Knickerbocker Realty Co., 846 F. Supp. 445, 450 (D. Md. 1994)
(holding the creditor liable for damages for not taking steps to terminate security interest
or at least for not seeking equitable relief before a court); Aquino v. Pub. Fin. Consumer
Disc. Co., 606 F. Supp. 504, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that the creditor was free to
petition the court to determine rights and obligations of the parties under 15 U.S.C. §
1635(b) (1982)); Lynch v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. of Iowa (In re Lynch), 170 B.R. 26,
31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (finding that “defendant could have mitigated its loss had it
moved to protect its rights in a court of competent jurisdiction within the twenty-day
statutory period”).
175. See Gill v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co., 671 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (E.D. Pa.
1987), aff’d, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988); Jackson v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n Tr. (In re
Jackson), 245 B.R. 23, 34 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000); Ralls v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Ralls),
230 B.R. 508, 524 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999); Family Fin. Servs. v. Spencer, 677 A.2d 479,
488 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). But see Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 575 F.2d 580, 584
(5th Cir. 1978); Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 710 F. Supp. 143, 145–46
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all, a court can use its modification power to respect a lender’s security
interest, while working out an equitable solution in the context of the
consumer’s rescission.176 If the lender has not received the consumer’s
rescission notice, it will become aware of a problem when the consumer
seeks to enforce his rights. In that event, the lender will have to act on
the rescission unless it has a basis for resisting.177 But even then, the
lender should not be liable for its failure to respond within the statutory
twenty-day period if it did not receive the rescission notice, and a court
should not be reluctant to use its modification power in that event.178
If the lender has received the consumer’s rescission notice, it should
not use dilatory tactics in dealing with the consumer’s communication.
Regulation Z requires the lender to act within twenty days after receiving a
notice of rescission; thus a consumer may feel that he has no alternative
to a lawsuit if he gets no response. In Velazquez v. Homeamerican Credit,
Inc., the lender responded within twenty days, assuring the consumer
that it had “initiated the rescission process,” and promising an itemized
statement of the rescission amount.179 The lender did not keep its promise,
and then the consumer sued not only for a declaratory judgment concerning
rescission, but also for damages.180 The lender failed in its motion to
dismiss the consumer’s complaint, and with good reason.181 Although the
Commentary indicates that the lender need not complete the rescission

(E.D. Pa. 1989); Bilal v. Household Fin. Corp. III (In re Bilal), 296 B.R. 828, 840 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 2003).
176. Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1992);
Brown v. Nat’l Permanent Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 683 F.2d 444, 447–48 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1980); Moazed v. First
Union Mortgage Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 268, 272 (D. Conn. 2004); Ray v. Citifinancial
Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 664, 668 (D. Md. 2002); Stanley v. Household Fin. Corp. III (In re
Stanley), 315 B.R. 602, 612 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004). But see Celona v. Equitable Nat’l
Bank, 98 B.R. 705, 707–08 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Williams v. BankOne, Nat’l Ass’n, Tr. (In
re Williams), 291 B.R. 636, 661 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003).
177. See Belini v. Washington Mutual Bank, 412 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2005); Abel,
846 F. Supp. at 448; Bell v. Parkway Mortgage, Inc. (In re Bell), 309 B.R. 139, 154
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004). But cf. Webster v. Centex Home Equity Corp. (In re Webster),
300 B.R. 787, 802 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2003) (refusing to allow statutory damages for
rescission violation when creditor promptly sought declaratory judgment).
178. See Wilson v. Homeowners Loan Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1219 (E.D.
Mo. 2003); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.6.4.1.
179. 254 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
180. See id.
181. See id. at 1048.
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procedure within the twenty-day period,182 the lender cannot merely
appease the consumer with a statement that the procedure has begun and
then sit idly by. It must do more than that. In Velazquez the twentyday period expired without the lender doing anything more, and the
consumer waited patiently for some response.183 But if there was any
doubt about what the lender had in mind, its initial letter removed that
doubt with the lender’s promise to release its mortgage when the consumer
paid the rescission amount.184 The lender conditioned its performance
on the consumer’s return of the mortgage funds, and ignored the statutory
prescription to carry out the consumer’s rescission.185 Furthermore, it was
well nigh impossible for the consumer to fulfill the lender’s conditions if
the lender did not see fit to provide an itemized statement of the rescission
amount, as it had promised. The consumer therefore had standing to
pursue her claim.186
Despite the lender’s inaction, the court was keen to point out that its
ruling did not mean that the lender would forfeit the loan proceeds.187
This was certainly in keeping with the judicial trend to avoid forfeiture

182. With respect to the creditor’s action to terminate the security interest, the
Commentary makes this point: “The 20-day period for the creditor’s action refers to the
time within which the creditor must begin the process. It does not require all necessary
steps to have been completed within that time, but the creditor is responsible for seeing
the process through to completion.” 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 23(d)(2)-3 (2007).
183. The creditor notified the consumer on December 17, 2002, that it was agreeing
to rescind the consumer’s loan. The creditor’s letter indicated: “You will receive a letter
shortly containing an itemized statement of the rescission amount. Upland will release
its mortgage simultaneously with, or otherwise upon receipt of, payment of the rescission
amount.” Velazquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1044. When the consumer filed suit on January
14, 2003, she still had heard nothing further from the creditor. Id.
184. The creditor promised to release its mortgage when it received payment. See id.
185. The court emphasized that the creditor could not unilaterally impose its will on
the rescission process by making the consumer pay before it rescinded the loan. See id.
at 1047. The consumer had given signs of its unwillingness or inability to perform. See
id. If the creditor disrupted the consumer’s right to rescind, it could have sought a
judicial declaration of its rights and obligations. See Aquino v. Pub. Fin. Consumer Disc. Co.,
606 F. Supp. 504, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also Lynch v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. of
Iowa (In re Lynch), 170 B.R. 26, 31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (finding that “the defendant
could have mitigated its loss had it moved to protect its rights in a court of competent
jurisdiction within the twenty-day statutory period”).
186. Velazquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. The court compared the situation in
Velasquez with that in Personius v. Homeamerican Credit, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 817,
819 (N.D. Ill. 2002), where the creditor actually produced the itemized statements it
promised to the consumer and did so within ten days. Velazquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at
1047. Nevertheless, the consumer in Personius filed suit two days after requesting
rescission, that is, within the statutory twenty-day period allowed for the creditor’s
performance. Personius, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 819. The court in Personius denied the
consumer standing to sue for rescission in light of these factors. See id. at 820.
187. See Velasquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
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whenever possible,188 but the court was also mindful of its authority to
modify the rescission procedure if that was necessary to protect the
lender.189 But the lender could not unilaterally decide to impose its own
will on the consumer, particularly when the consumer had not given any
indication of his unwillingness to perform. If a lender is worried about a
consumer’s ability or willingness to perform,190 it should seek a court’s
intervention to delay a release of the mortgage until the consumer repays
the amount that is due on rescission.
B. Ambiguity in Language
When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the creditor must “return any
money or property that has been given to anyone in connection with the
transaction . . . .”191 The consumer is not liable for any finance charge
when he rescinds, and the creditor has to refund to the consumer any
amount that is recognized as a finance charge.192 The creditor must also
refund all other charges even if the creditor is allowed to include them in
the amount financed, rather than the finance charge.193 If the consumer
incurred costs outside the credit transaction such as for a building permit
or a zoning variance, the creditor is not responsible for refunding these
costs.194 If the charge is a lock-in fee, however, the creditor must refund
188. See Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 575 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1978)
(allowing recovery of damages for violation but not forfeiture of loan proceeds);
Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 710 F. Supp. 143, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(holding that where there is no fraud by lender and no tender of proceeds by consumer,
consumer must return loan proceeds to lender); Bell v. Parkway Mortgage, Inc. (In re
Bell), 314 B.R. 54, 60–61 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004) (refusing to order forfeiture where
lender could not tell from documentation that the consumer did not get the required
rescission notice); Bilal v. Household Fin. Corp. III (In re Bilal), 296 B.R. 828, 839
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (holding that consumer’s only remedy for lender’s failure to
tender is damages and lender does not forfeit right to recover amounts due from
consumer).
189. See Velasquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
190. See id.
191. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(2) (2007).
192. See Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 705 (9th
Cir. 1986); Milbourne v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Milbourne), 108 B.R.
522, 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
193. For example, if the creditor meets certain criteria, it may include credit insurance
premiums in the amount financed, rather than in the finance charge. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(1)
(2007). Certain security interest charges may also be excluded from the finance charge,
but they must also be refunded to the consumer. See id. § 226.4(e).
194. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 23(d)(2)-2 (2007); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., supra note 4, § 6.6.4.2.
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it if the consumer rescinds. The creditor in Jones v. E*Trade Mortgage
Corp.195 had an agreement with the consumer to refund the lock-in fee
only if the creditor did not approve the loan because of credit problems.196
The creditor wanted to treat the lock-in fee agreement as a separate
transaction that was not related to the right of rescission under the
loan.197 The Ninth Circuit rejected the creditor’s argument because the
lock-in agreement was part of the application for credit and was simply
one of the several steps in obtaining a loan.198 It also did not matter that
the consumer could not have obtained a refund if the loan did not
close.199
In Sampanetti v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., the court took a different
tack by recognizing that the refund language in the lock-in agreement
applied only when the loan did not close.200 It was left to speculation,
therefore, whether the refund issue related to postclosing events. The creditor
had dutifully used the Board’s model rescission form, and no more could
have been expected of it on that score.201 It remained, therefore, for the
court to explain that the rescission and refund provisions do not apply
when a loan has not yet closed.202 It seemed unlikely that there was a
contradiction between the lock-in agreement and the notice of the right
to rescind. The lock-in agreement dealt only with rescission of an
application, whereas the notice related to a loan after it closed. It is
195. 397 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 2005).
196. The lender’s application loan checklist provided that the lender “would verify
property value, property conditions . . . and certain other information,” and if the lender
did not approve the loan for closing, the lock-in fee would be refunded. Id. at 813–14.
197. See id. at 813.
198. See id.; NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.6.4.2; Problems with
the Non-Refundable Lock-in Fee, CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE
REP., May 2005, at 1, 1–2.
199. The court made short shrift of the creditor’s argument by stating that it was
“irrelevant to this case.” Jones, 397 F.3d at 813.
200. No. 02-C-3513, 2002 WL 31478269, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2002). The lockin agreement stated in pertinent part:
If you provide [ETrade] with all documentation requested of you (within 3
calendar days) to complete the underwriting review of your loan application . . . and,
following such review, [ETrade] does not approve your loan for closing, based
on income qualifying or credit, the lock-in fee will be refunded to you. If your
loan fails to close for any other reason ( [sic] including your decision to cancel
the application, then the lock-in fee will not be refunded to you.
Id. at *1 (alterations in original).
201. See id. at *2. The Board has published certain model disclosure forms that
creditors can use for their closed-end transactions. Among them is the rescission model
form. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, app. H-8 (2007).
202. Sampanetti, 2002 WL 31478269, at *2. One usually thinks of the right of rescission
as related to the closing or consummation of the transaction. It is one of the events that
must occur for a consumer to be able to rescind. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2007). In
Sampanetti, the court was dealing with a lock-in fee relating to the consumer’s
application, not consummation. See Sampanetti, 2002 WL 31478269, at *1.
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arguable, therefore, that Truth in Lending does not require the refund of
a lock-in fee if a loan fails to close, but that does not affect a consumer’s
right to a refund if the loan closes and the consumer rescinds the transaction.203
A consumer’s complaint about ambiguity and contradiction may arise
in other contexts. In Hamm v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., the consumer
was displeased because the lender did not adequately inform her of her
right of rescission.204 It was the lender’s generosity that led to this complaint,
because the lender gave the consumer not only the statutory notice
explaining the three-day period for rescission, but also a separate form
that provided for a one-week cancellation period in accordance with the
lender’s policy.205 The one-week form reiterated the consumer’s right to
rescind under federal law, but then explained in a separate paragraph the
lender’s policy to give one week for rescission, so that a consumer
would have more time to review the documents.206 It was not clear how
the one-week form negated the statutory three-day notice, but the consumer
tried to convince the court of the inevitable confusion that would ensue
by exposing the consumer to both.207 It was to no avail in the court’s view,
because an ordinary customer would understand that the one-week
cancellation option was merely a goodwill gesture that did not detract
from the regulatory language.208
Nevertheless, there may be more to this than meets the eye. The court
in Jones v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. recognized the problems that might
ensue from a creditor’s generosity in giving a consumer a longer period
to rescind.209 Once the consumer goes beyond the three-day period, there is
no guarantee that he will be entitled to remedies like damages or attorney’s
fees.210 This was sufficient for the court in Jones not to grant summary
judgment to either party.211 The two rescission notices could confuse the
203. See Problems with the Non-Refundable Lock-in Fee, supra note 198, at 1.
204. No. 05-C-227, 2005 WL 2405804, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005).
205. See id.
206. See id. at *3.
207. See id. at *2.
208. This was enough for the court to grant summary judgment to the creditor. Id.
at *4. The court held that “no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Ameriquest’s
disclosures regarding the right of recision were inadequate under TILA.” Id. at *3.
209. No. 05-CV-0432, 2006 WL 273545, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2006).
210. See id.
211. In denying summary judgment, the court observed:
A reasonable fact finder, then, could conclude that, for an ordinary consumer,
the One-Week form detracts from the clarity of the federal form in that the
One-Week form purports to be a mere extension of the TILA right but does not
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borrower about the consequences of choosing one method of rescission
over the other, for if the consumer decided to rescind sometime between
the third day and the seventh day in accordance with the creditor’s
policy, she might place herself at a disadvantage if she could not benefit
from the statutory benefits that would accrue under normal circumstances.212
If a creditor wishes to be more liberal about rescission than the
regulation demands, it should make it quite clear that the consumer will
continue to enjoy all the rights and privileges conferred on him by Truth
in Lending, and that the creditor is merely extending the time for the
consumer to act. The lender must be careful not to call the clarity of its
disclosure into question by informing the consumer of the three-day
period for rescinding and then giving an expiration date for rescission
that is inconsistent with that period. The creditor’s objective must be to
avoid conflicting dates that may lead to a finding that the creditor has
not given clear and conspicuous disclosures.213
C. Termination of the Right
If a lender fails to live up to its responsibility, the right of rescission
can continue for three years.214 However, the right will expire before
that time if the consumer sells the property.215 The “sale” contemplated
by the statute occurs at the time of contract, rather than later at the time

explain the differences, if any, in the rescission rights. Indeed, a fact finder is
needed to determine whether those differences exist.
Id. at *8.
212. A similar situation arose in Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 109 F. Supp.
2d 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2000), where the creditor notified the consumer that he could
cancel within one day as allowed under state law, but also gave the rescission notice
required under Truth in Lending for canceling within three days. The court concluded
that the two different periods that the creditor mentioned for rescission rendered the
TILA rescission notice unclear and therefore extended the rescission period for three
years. Id. at 361; see also Porter v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Porter), 961
F.2d 1066, 1077 (1992) (finding the H-8 form used by the creditor did not give consumer
clear notice of the right to rescind in a refinancing transaction); Gibbons v. Interbank
Funding Group, 208 F.R.D. 278, 284 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that rescission form was
misleading because creditor used the wrong form); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra
note 4, § 6.4.3.7. But see Haw. Cmty. Fed. Credit Union v. Keka, 11 P.3d 1, 13 (Haw.
2000) (finding that no prejudice results to the consumer when the creditor gives the
consumer more than the statutory three-day period to rescind).
213. Regulation Z requires a creditor to make disclosures “clearly and conspicuously.”
12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(1) (2007). A creditor may have difficulty not only by providing
two different rescission periods, but also by committing other errors such as failing to fill
in the expiration date for rescission. See Semar v. Platte Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791
F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1986); Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 768 (5th Cir.
1983); Reynolds v. D & N Bank, 792 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
214. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2007).
215. Id.
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of conveyance.216 Setting the earlier contract time as the cut-off for
rescission carries out the congressional policy of avoiding a cloud on
title.217 A later date can have a negative impact on the rights of purchasers
and lead to litigation. Adopting the earlier time avoids these possibilities
and settles matters for the parties to the transaction.218
The result should not be any different if a consumer rescinds and then
sells the property. In that event, a consumer cannot continue to press for
rescission, because the sale terminates the right to rescind. Therefore,
when the consumers in Meyer v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. sold their home
while their rescission lawsuit was pending, the sale terminated the consumers’
right to rescind.219 The Meyer court made it clear that the Hefferman
pronouncement—that the consumer in the latter case should have sent
her rescission notice before contracting to sell her property—did not
mean that if an actual sale occurred, a rescission notice that preceded the
sale would be valid.220 The Meyer court thought it necessary to clarify
the point that the time when a consumer rescinds does not control for all
intents and purposes. So, a presale rescission notice will cease to be
effective once a sale occurs.221
The Official Staff Commentary advises that “a foreclosure sale [will]
terminate an unexpired right to rescind.”222 There is authority for the
position that a sale is not complete until the consumer’s right to redeem
has expired,223 but in Marschner v. RJR Financial Services, Inc., the court
216. See Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 1989); Dailey v. Leshin,
792 So. 2d 527, 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
217. See 1972 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. ON TRUTH IN LENDING, reprinted in 119
CONG. REC. 4596–97 (1973).
218. See Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 531–32; Weber v. Langholz, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677,
681 (Ct. App. 1995).
219. 331 F.3d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 342 F.3d 899 (9th Cir.
2003).
220. See Meyer v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 342 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2003).
221. See id. The Meyer court treated as dictum the suggestion of the court in
Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1989), that the rescission notice that the
consumer sent prior to contracting for sale of the property would have been effective. Id.
at 900.
222. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 23(a)(3)-3 (2007).
223. See Bestrom v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Bestrom), 114 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir.
1997); Walker v. Contimortgage (In re Walker), 232 B.R. 725, 732 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1999). But cf. Worthy v. World Wide Fin. Servs. Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507–08
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that right of rescission terminated even though redemption
period had not ended); Aames Funding Corp. v. Mores, 110 P.3d 1042, 1049–50 (Haw.
2005) (finding that nonjudicial foreclosure sale made deed valid and not affected by
attempted rescission thereafter).
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explained that the consumer’s right of redemption was not an interest in
land, but rather a legal right created by statute.224 Therefore, the foreclosure
sale cut off the consumer’s right to rescind. But the court also pointed
out that, even if the consumer’s right of rescission continued through the
redemption period, the consumer did not exercise his right in time
because his filing an action for rescission with the court before the
redemption period expired did not constitute notice to the lender of the
consumer’s rescission.225 That notice came days later when the consumer
served the lender with a summons in the suit for rescission.226
Regulation Z recognizes that the consumer’s extended right to rescind
can expire even before three years have gone by if the consumer transfers
all his interest or when he sells the property.227 This suggests that sales
and transfers are two distinct events, and the Commentary states that “[a]
sale or transfer of the property need not be voluntary to terminate the
right to rescind.”228 It was this language that led the court in Worthy v. World
Wide Financial Services, Inc.229 to conclude that, although a foreclosure
sale may not always transfer all of a consumer’s interest because of the
redemption feature, it always terminates the consumer’s right of rescission.230
The court would not ignore the Board’s reasonable construction of the
regulation and preferred to give an ordinary meaning to the phrases
“foreclosure sale” and “transfer of all of the consumer’s interest.”231 It was
another victory for judicial deference to administrative interpretation, for
the Commentary left little doubt about the effect of a foreclosure sale.232
A consumer’s right of rescission may be called into question in another
context: when a consumer tries to rescind a mortgage after paying it off.
In an early post-TILA case, the Ninth Circuit denied the consumer the
right to rescind after the consumer refinanced her loan, on the ground that
there was nothing to rescind.233 Nevertheless, both the Sixth Circuit234 and
the Seventh Circuit235 have recently disagreed with the Ninth Circuit
by emphasizing that there is a difference between merely rescinding a
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

382 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
Id. at 922.
Id.
12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2007).
12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 23(a)(3)-3 (2007).
347 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507–08 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
See id. at 507; see also Foreclosure Auction Is a “Sale” Ending Right to Rescind,
CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., Mar. 2005, at 4.
231. Worthy, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
232. See id.
233. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1986). The consumer was
trying to rescind a loan that she had already refinanced. See id. Thus, the lien resulting
from that loan was superseded by the later loan. See id.
234. Barrett v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 445 F.3d 874, 880 (6th Cir. 2006).
235. Handy v. Anchor Mortgage Corp., 464 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2006).
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security interest and rescinding a transaction.236 Although a rescission will
void a security interest,237 it also requires a lender to return any money or
fees generated by the transaction.238 Therefore, it is not only the security
interest that is in play here, but also the fees and other charges that the
consumer may have paid on consummation of the transaction.
Although a consumer will normally have three days after consummation
to rescind, that period can extend as long as three years if the lender does
not give the consumer a notice of the right to rescind, or if the lender
makes a mistake with its material disclosures.239 Nevertheless, even this
extended right to rescind will end during that three-year period if the
consumer transfers the interest in his home or sells the property, whichever
happens first.240 There is nothing in TILA or Regulation Z that allows
another event, like a pay-off or refinancing of the transaction, to extinguish
the consumer’s right of rescission.241 The consumer’s payment of the
loan will result in a termination of the lender’s mortgage lien, but it will
have no impact on the consumer’s right to seek reimbursement of the
charges that he could have avoided if the loan had not closed in the first
place.242 This is why the Sixth Circuit emphasized in Barrett v. JP Morgan
236. See id. at 765; Barrett, 445 F.3d at 880.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1) (2007). Although the statute
and the regulation both suggest that the security interest becomes void automatically
when a consumer rescinds, there is considerable authority for a court to modify the
rescission procedures and condition the removal of the lender’s lien on terms that are just
and equitable. See, e.g., Am. Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 821 (4th
Cir. 2007) (holding that “unilateral notification of cancellation does not unilaterally void
the loan contract” and that unconditional rescission was inappropriate where borrowers
could not repay loan); Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1172–73 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that security interest becomes void only when “the right to rescind is
determined in the borrower’s favor” and that a court may consider rescission on borrower’s
tender); Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1992)
(“[A] court may impose conditions that run with the voiding of a creditor’s security interest.”);
Ruiz v. R & G Fin. Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 318, 322 (D.P.R. 2005) (conditioning rescission on
the borrower’s tender of loan proceeds).
238. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1)–(2).
239. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3).
240. Id.
241. Regulation Z provides: “If the required notice or material disclosures are not
delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation, upon transfer of
all the consumer’s interest in the property, or upon sale of the property, whichever occurs
first.” Id.
242. It is a matter of returning to the status quo ante. See Handy v. Anchor Mortgage
Corp., 464 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2006); Barrett v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 445
F.3d 874, 880 (6th Cir. 2006); Quenzer v. Advanta Mortgage Corp. USA, 288 B.R. 884,
888 (D. Kan. 2003). This is one way of protecting the consumer’s right to recover his
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Chase Bank, N.A. that the right of rescission applies to the transaction
itself, and not merely to the security interest.243 So, even though a lender
may no longer have a security interest, the consumer still has the right to
seek a return of finance charges and other costs in the transaction if the
consumer is to enjoy all the incidents of the extended right of rescission.244
V. THE CHANGE IN TERMS
A. Change in Fees or APR
It is not unusual for a lender to include in its credit agreements a
provision that allows it to change the terms thereof at a later time. But a
lender must express this right to change the terms of the credit agreement in
a way that does not detract from disclosures that reflect the legal obligation
of the parties.245 The disclosures must be clear and conspicuous, so that
a consumer will have the opportunity to make a meaningful comparison
between the credit terms available from various lenders.246 When the
disclosures indicate that a consumer will have to pay no annual fee once
he signs up for a credit card, they play a significant role in attracting new
customers to the lender. If the lender tries later to impose an annual fee,
the customer may find that there is a provision somewhere in the credit
card agreement that allows the lender to do so.
A consumer found herself in that predicament in Rossman v. Fleet
Bank (R.I.) National Ass’n.247 The lender sent the consumer an information
leaflet that indicated there was no annual fee attached to the credit
card.248 Nevertheless, the lender listed other fees outside the disclosure
box and also indicated that it reserved the right to change the benefit

transaction charges when the consumer’s right of rescission continues for three years
because of the lender’s failure to comply, regardless of whether there has been a refinancing
or not.
243. Barrett, 445 F.3d at 880; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4,
6.3.2.3 (Supp. 2006).
244. See Barrett, 445 F.3d at 880; Pacific Shore Funding v. Lozo, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d
283, 291 (Ct. App. 2006); see also Two Appellate Courts Say That TILA Rescission
Right is NOT Extinguished Upon Refinancing, NCLC REPS., CONSUMER CREDIT &
USURY EDITION, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 17.
245. Regulation Z requires that “[d]isclosures shall reflect the terms of the legal
obligation between the parties.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(c) (2007).
246. See generally id. § 226.5(a) (describing general disclosure requirements for
open-end credit).
247. 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002).
248. See id. at 387. The consumer information leaflet contained a table of basic
credit card information in the so-called Schumer Box, named in honor of Representative
(now Senator) Schumer, who was the principal sponsor of the House bill that led to the
amendment of the Truth in Lending Act. See Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, § 2, 102 Stat. 2960, 2960–66.
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features of the card at any time.249 When the consumer received her
credit card agreement, it contained the following provision: “No annual
membership fee will be charged to your account.”250 However, the
agreement also contained a change-in-terms provision that the lender
used later to impose an annual fee.251 The issue was whether the lender
had violated the Act by misleading consumers with its “no-annual fee”
credit card. The answer to that question depended on the meaning of the
cardholder agreement. If the agreement did not allow the “no annual fee”
pledge to be changed before the end of the first year, the lender’s disclosure
was satisfactory. If the agreement allowed such a modification, then the
disclosure constituted a violation, and the only way for that to be determined
was for the court to remand the case for the district court’s consideration.
If the cardholder agreement gave the bank the right to impose an annual
fee, the lender’s solicitation materials were misleading. A reasonable
consumer could read the solicitation language as rejecting an annual fee
for at least one year.252 The consumer should expect to have a year’s use
of the card without paying any fee, and therefore the lender’s statement
to the contrary was misleading. In the court’s view, the lender’s use of the
“no annual fee” terminology was not a clear and conspicuous disclosure
that permitted the lender to assess a fee before one year had expired.253
Although the lender did not have an obligation to disclose the change-interms provision under the Act, it had an obligation to disclose annual
fees and the “no annual fee” statement was misleading with respect to the
duration of the offer.254 Thus, if the cardholder agreement permitted the
249. See Rossman, 280 F.3d at 388.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 394. Professor Epstein read that result as “an eminently sensible effort to
make commercial sense of an agreement, by using the term ‘annual’ in the disclosure
form to benchmark the duration of the promise.” Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral
Economics: Human Errors and Market Correction, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 126 (2006).
253. See Rossman, 280 F.3d at 394. The court viewed the agreement as ambiguous
at best because “[i]nterpreting the statement with an implied annual term [was] as natural
as interpreting it with no such term.” Id. Such ambiguity should be resolved in the
consumer’s favor because the Act should be construed liberally as a consumer protection
statute because of its remedial nature. Roberts v. Fleet Bank, 342 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir.
2003); Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, N.A., 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1998); Ellis v. GMAC,
160 F.3d 703, 707 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 156
F.3d 499, 502 (3d Cir. 1998).
254. There is a difference between having an obligation to disclose a change-in-terms
provision and an obligation to disclose annual fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I)
(2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(2) (2007).
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lender to assess a fee before one year had gone by, the lender had an
obligation to clarify the issue if it hoped to meet Truth in Lending
requirements.255
On the other hand, if the agreement did not permit the lender to impose a
fee, the original disclosure would have been consistent with the subsequent
agreement and therefore would not have violated the Act.256 There would
be nothing misleading under such circumstances because the disclosure
would have reflected the terms of the account that the lender was offering.
This is why the court in Rossman remanded for a determination about the
false or misleading nature of the disclosure. It all depended on the meaning
of the agreement.
A change-in-terms provision can also lead to other difficulties. If a
lender intends at the time of its disclosure to impose a fee later, it is
questionable whether the lender should be free from liability simply because
the agreement did not contemplate an annual fee. In a credit card solicitation,
the disclosures which the lender gives to the consumer usually reflect the
terms covered by the agreement between the parties. A consumer would
not expect the lender to make certain disclosures, but then not advise the
consumer that the disclosed terms would not last very long.257 The

255. In Rossman the solicitation disclosure indicated that the lender had the right to
change the card’s benefit features. See Rossman, 280 F.3d at 388. The disclosure also
contained a list of benefits, such as free rental car insurance and free year-end account
summary, but said nothing about other features like lack of an annual fee. See id. at 394
n.10. All of this information was provided outside the Schumer Box and the lender’s
right to change any of the so-called benefits did not give a consumer any clue that an
annual fee was covered by the benefits language.
256. In Demando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 2000), the credit card company
originally offered the consumer a permanent, fixed rate and later tried to increase it through a
change-in-terms clause contained in the agreement. The court concluded that the notice
of the rate change violated TILA because it disclosed a rate that was not permitted under
the agreement. Id. at 1303. In Rossman, the consumer did not claim that the letter about
the change in terms itself violated TILA. The TILA claim was viable only if the
agreement between the parties allowed the lender to impose an annual fee. See Rossman,
280 F.3d at 395. The determination about the false or misleading nature of the “noannual fee” promise depended on an evaluation of that part of the agreement that the noannual fee statement purported to disclose. See id. The Rossman court read the lender’s
language as at least preventing the lender from imposing any fee for a year. See id. at
394; see also Epstein, supra note 252, at 126.
257. It has been said that these change-in-terms provisions detract from Truth in
Lending’s purpose of providing effective disclosure of credit terms. Many consumers
probably fail to grasp the meaning of these provisions. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
THE COST OF CREDIT § 11.7.2.4 (3d ed. 2005). In construing a change-in-terms provision one
court took the following view:
The Change in Terms provision is reasonably limited to terms previously
contemplated by the original agreement, so long as cardholders do not accept
the unilateral change by continuing to use their cards. Otherwise, credit card
holders would find themselves in an Orwellian nightmare, trapped in agreements
that can be amended unilaterally in ways they never envisioned.
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intention not to extend credit on the disclosed terms puts the consumer in
an untenable position. In the classic bait-and-switch situation, a consumer
may be able to detect that the terms which a lender initially proposed are
not the same that it is asking the consumer to accept once consummation
approaches.258 A consumer has the last clear chance to reject the transaction
before consummation and thus stop the lender in its tracks before the
damage has been done.259 At least in such a case, a consumer has little to
complain about once the lender makes the disclosures before consummation.
On the other hand, when a consumer enters into a contract with the
lender without knowing that a change in the annual fee is imminent, he
is at a serious disadvantage if he commits without being aware of the
lender’s intentions.260 When the change occurs, the consumer may be heavily
in debt to the lender and may not be able to pay off his debt immediately
to avoid new terms that the lender knew was in the offing, but that the
consumer did not anticipate. The Official Staff Commentary recognizes
that, when a card issuer offers fees that are reduced or waived for a
certain period, it must disclose the fee that will apply indefinitely, and

Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 2004 WL 1508518, at *14 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004)
(footnote omitted).
258. In Clark v. Troy & Nichols Inc., 864 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1989), the court
recognized the bait-and-switch possibilities but did not see Truth in Lending as providing
a remedy. The court observed that “[t]he fact that [the lender] may not have intended to
loan money under the stated terms does not make [its] disclosures with respect to the
stated terms inaccurate.” Id. at 1264. There is no Truth in Lending violation in the “spot
delivery” transaction where a dealer enters into a sales contract with a consumer at a low
interest rate, knowing full well that the consumer will not qualify for the low rate, but
nevertheless giving the consumer possession of the car in anticipation of qualifying the
consumer for a higher rate once the original credit application is rejected. See Janikowski v.
Lynch Ford, Inc. 210 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, there is a potential for
abuse in spot delivery transactions. See Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. 220
F.R.D. 64 n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 2004); Rucker v. Sheehy Alexandria, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 711,
719 (E.D. Va. 2002); Mayberry v. Ememessay, 201 F. Supp. 2d 687, 695 (E.D. Va.
2001).
259. The Rossman court distinguished Clark v. Troy & Nichols, 864 F.2d 1261 (5th
Cir. 1989), this way:
Clark was a classic bait-and-switch case. The plaintiff there was first attracted
by a deceptive offer. Having obtained his audience, the lender attempted to
switch the offer to a set of terms more favorable to itself and less favorable to
the borrower. All of this occurred before the consummation of an agreement.
Clark was able to, and chose to, refuse the switch based on accurate disclosures.
Rossman, 280 F.3d at 397 (emphasis added).
260. The deception about the lender’s intentions may be even more troublesome
than inaccurate disclosures. A consumer cannot get into the lender’s mind to ascertain
the true state of affairs. See Clark, 864 F.2d at 1266 (Thornberry, J., dissenting).
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may disclose introductory rates only if it also indicates the period for
which such rates are applicable.261 If the lender has an obligation to set
out the applicable rates in this situation, the same rule should apply
when the lender harbors secret intentions to apply a fee where there was
none before. It is surely misleading for a card issuer to solicit a consumer
with a “no annual fee” or a low-rate pledge, and then promptly implement
its secret strategy through a change-in-terms provision.262
Another example of the mischief caused by such a provision came in
Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.).263 This time the disclosure box—otherwise
known as the Schumer Box264—in the solicitation materials assured the
consumer of a 7.99% APR with the prospect of a change only if the
consumer failed to meet any repayment requirements or he closed the
account.265 The cardholder agreement which the consumer later received
repeated the same information in one provision, but in another stipulated
that the creditor reserved the right to change the terms of the agreement
at any time.266 The question was whether the bank had clearly and
conspicuously disclosed its right to change the APR, given the inconsistency
between the information about the APR in the solicitation material and
the bank’s disclosure of its right to change the APR.
In reversing the district court and remanding for further proceedings,
the court recognized that there was a material question of fact as to
whether the bank had misled the consumer with its solicitations, and thus
failed to live up to its responsibility to provide clear and conspicuous
disclosures.267 A reasonable consumer could conclude that the bank
261. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp.1, cmt. 5a(b)(1)1-5 (2007).
262. It has been said that “these expansive change-in-terms provisions deprive
consumers of any ‘benefit of bargain’ and thus undermine the TILA’s purpose in ensuring
effective disclosure.” Carolyn Carter et al., The Credit Card Market and Regulation: In
Need of Repair, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 23, 49 (2006). The authors go on to suggest that
changes in terms should not be allowed in credit card contracts. Id. at 51. In some cases
consumers are at the mercy of the creditor because state law may allow a creditor to
change the terms of the agreement even without a change-in-terms clause. See NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 257, § 11.7.2.4 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a)
(2005)).
263. 342 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2003).
264. For an explanation of the Schumer Box, see id. at 263 n.1; Greisz v. Household
Bank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1039 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1998); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra
note 4, § 5.4.2.2 & n.190.
265. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 263.
266. Id. at 264.
267. Id. at 269. Congress had hoped to encourage clear and transparent disclosures
in the credit card industry by enacting the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, § 2, 102 Stat. 2960, 2960–66. The Senate Report indicated
as follows:
It is estimated that U.S. consumers will receive over 2,400,000,000 solicitations
for credit cards in 1987. Unfortunately, far too many of them do not disclose
the basic cost information about the card. By law, such information need not
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could change the APR only under the two specific conditions identified
in the disclosure, and thus there was a question of fact about the adequacy
of the bank’s disclosures amidst conflicting language elsewhere that the
bank could change the terms at any time. It is true that the bank could
not legally include the change-in-terms provision in the disclosure box,
but the question was whether the bank had properly disclosed the APR,
and not whether it had properly disclosed that provision.268
Although Truth in Lending’s requirements of clarity and conspicuousness
apply to disclosures in the initial disclosure statement and the disclosure
box,269 this does not prevent a court from examining other statements that a
creditor makes in its solicitation materials in order to decide whether a
credit card issuer has complied with Truth in Lending requirements.270
This is understandable, for a creditor might scrupulously follow the
be disclosed until the consumer actually receives the card. Moreover, the information
consumers receive with the cards covers the entire credit relationship and is often
complicated and intimidating. While consumers are legally entitled to return the
cards without incurring any charges if they are dissatisfied with the terms, the
situation is obviously not conducive to comparison shopping. This lack of disclosure
at the time of application or solicitation may help explain why credit card
profits remain so high despite the large number of card issuers.
The Committee believes that early disclosure of relevant cost information,
coupled with widespread publication of the costs of different cards will help
remedy the problem of enabling consumers to shop around for the best cards.
The resulting competition should be good for both consumers and competition.
S. REP. NO. 100-259, at 2–3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936, 3938.
268. The lender sought refuge in the fact that it could not legally include the
change-in-terms provision in the Schumer Box. See Roberts, 342 F.3d at 269. But the
Schumer Box disclosed that the rates could be changed for two reasons only, and the
court was really concerned about the adequacy of the APR disclosure. See id. at 266.
The defendant’s counsel admitted the likelihood of an inconsistency in the language,
thus giving substance to the argument that a reasonable consumer might find the
materials confusing and misleading. See id. at 268 n.4.
269. See 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a), (c) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(1) (2007).
270. It would be difficult to achieve Truth in Lending’s ultimate objective to require
meaningful disclosure if a lender could ignore its obligations for any disclosure outside
the Schumer Box. The Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act was intended to give
consumers the necessary information for comparing the terms for credit cards available
in the market place. See Roberts, 342 F.3d at 268. A lender should not be free to make
misleading statements just because they are not literally false. See Rossman v. Fleet Bank
(R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384, 390–91 (3d Cir. 2002); Taylor v. Quality Hyundai Inc.,
150 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 975 (5th Cir.
1980). It is important for courts to consider the entire picture in deciding whether a
lender has met the clear and conspicuous disclosure requirement, particularly when
credit card agreements are relatively complex and pose a challenge to the average
consumer. See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 907
(2006).
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disclosure requirements after misleading a consumer with statements in
its solicitation materials.271 Thus, the prescription for the disclosure box does
not shield credit card companies from liability for placing misleading
information outside the box. The consumer in Roberts must have been
delighted with the bank’s promise that the interest rate being offered was
not an introductory rate and that “it won’t go up in just a few short
months.”272 She must have been assuaged also by the disclosure that the
APR could be raised only under two conditions. The disappointment came
later in the cardholder agreement with the change-in-terms provision.
By then the consumer had fallen prey to the card issuer’s solicitation,
and the only question was whether this occurred because of the lack of
clarity and conspicuousness on the card issuer’s part.273 Although the
consumer’s focus in cases like this may be on the Schumer Box, the card
issuer should not be allowed to send mixed messages with conflicting
language elsewhere, whether it is in the solicitation materials or in the
cardholder agreement. A consumer who relies on the possibility of a change
in terms under limited circumstances should not fear sudden confrontation
with an open-ended clause that includes other possibilities. After all,
Truth in Lending was designed to grant such protection to consumers in
the marketplace.
A change-in-terms provision does not give a creditor free rein to
change an agreement in any way it sees fit. Normally any modification
is binding only if the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed to it.
When a creditor makes changes that relate to terms such as the finance
charge, rates, and credit limits, it is easier to fit the change within the

271. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 gives
added protection to a consumer when the lender offers temporary or introductory rates.
The lender must disclose in its solicitation materials the circumstances under which the
lender may change its temporary APR and also indicate the APR that will apply
thereafter. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1303(a), 119 Stat. 23, 210 (amending Truth in Lending Act § 127(c), 15
U.S.C. § 1637(c) (2000)); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 5.4.3.2.2.
272. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 263. The lender in Roberts used to mail the cardholder
agreement containing information about rate changes after the consumer accepted the
card. This was another element that put the consumer at a disadvantage. In any event,
the issue still remained whether the cardholder agreement with the rate change language
contradicted the teaser language in the introductory materials. The defendant’s lawyer
admitted that “arguably there [was] an inconsistency.” Id. at 268 n.4. This seemed to be
a concession that a reasonable consumer could find the materials confusing and
misleading. See id.
273. Section 127(c) of TILA, amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, mentions at least four times the clear and conspicuous
requirement for disclosing the conditions affecting introductory rates. See Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 1303(a), 119 Stat. 23, 210 (2005) (amending TILA § 127(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)
(2000)); see also SHEILA M. WILLIAMS, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005: LAW AND EXPLANATION § 6303 (2005).
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latitude granted by the change-in-terms provision.274 This is so because
the matters that are subject to change are already contained in the original
agreement, and it is reasonable to expect that the parties had those
conditions in mind when they consummated the agreement. However,
when the creditor seeks to introduce new features into the agreement, the
consumer may feel that the change-in-terms provision does not support
such an approach.
B. The Arbitration Clause
In recent times, questions have been raised about the introduction of
an arbitration clause into an agreement through the change-in-terms
provision.275 An arbitration clause is not akin to a finance charge, or
a periodic rate, or a payment term. It relates instead to the resolution of
disputes between the parties, and therefore it is arguable that it adds a
new term to the agreement that was not in contemplation of the parties at
the time of consummation.
The court in Badie v. Bank of America certainly took this view of the
arbitration clause, and from the perspective of contract interpretation, gave
the new clause the emphasis it deserved because the original agreement
contained nothing of the sort.276 It was not sufficient, therefore, for the
lender merely to follow the prescribed procedure for modifying the
contract unilaterally if the modification was not consistent with the
subject matter covered by the contract.277 The Badie court observed the
importance of good faith and fair dealing between the parties and
rejected the proposition that there was no limitation on the nature of the
274. Regulation Z recognizes the importance of a consumer knowing about changes
in the terms of credit. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) (2007). Thus, the lender must give
written notice of a change in any term that had to be disclosed originally when the lender
solicited or opened the account. See id; see also Ralph J. Rohner & Thomas A. Durkin,
TILA “Finance” and “Other” Charges in Open-End Credit: The Cost-of-Credit
Principle Applied to Charges for Optional Products or Services, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 137, 145–46 (2005). It is different when a lender simply introduces new terms that
have no relation to anything contained in the original disclosures.
275. See Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 198
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Ct. App. 1998);
Discover Bank v. Shea, 827 A.2d 358, 361 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Rashmi
Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract: Evolving Paradigms for Regulating Consumer
Credit, 73 TENN. L. REV. 303, 331 & n.178 (2006); Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F.
Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 174 & n.86 (2006).
276. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 289 (Ct. App. 1998).
277. See id.
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substantive changes that the bank could make unilaterally.278 In this
respect, the lack of any limitation on the change-in-terms provision bordered
on the illusory nature of the contract, for a creditor could implement any
changes it wanted without having to worry about the original terms that
cemented the arrangement in the first place.279 Any such implied limitation
might be found in the universe of terms employed by the parties in the
original agreement. Therefore, when an agreement covers matters that
are integral to the bank-customer relationship like credit limits, finance
charges, and late charges, and says nothing about a collateral matter like
arbitration, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties did not intend to
cover that topic in the original agreement.
In Badie, the agreement allowed the creditor to change any term, and
some courts have construed that authority to change as not including
additions to the agreement.280 This was a way of explaining the Badie
decision. But the important consideration in Badie was whether the bank
could change terms, and not whether it could add new ones.281 Some
278. The court made the point:
Where . . . a party has the unilateral right to change the terms of a contract, it does
not act in an “objectively reasonable” manner . . . when it attempts to “recapture” a
forgone opportunity by adding an entirely new term which has no bearing on
any subject, issue, right, or obligation addressed in the original contract and
which was not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the
contract was entered into.
Id. at 284 (quoting Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 191 Cal. Rptr. 849, 857 (Ct. App. 1983)); see
also Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1698 (2006).
279. The Badie court observed that to avoid the label of illusoriness, it had to
recognize some implied limitation on the change-in-terms provision. See Badie, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 285. That limitation could be found by restricting any change to “the
universe of terms included in the original agreements.” Id. The court recognized this as
the objective determinant that, when combined with the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, produced the limitation. See id. It is not unusual for courts to look for these
elements in trying to save an agreement that might otherwise be suspect when one party
seems to have the discretion of performing or not performing. See 1 E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.13 (3d ed. 2004).
280. It is open to question whether a change in terms should also include an
addition. In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), the
lender modified its change-in-terms provision to allow it to “add” as well as “change”
any terms. Id. at 427. The court construed the provision against the lender as the drafter
of the instrument and construed it “as limiting any changes to modification of existing
terms—a construction that is also consistent with contract principles, reasonable
expectations, and the requirement of good faith.” Id. at 434.
281. The controversy in Badie revolved around the meaning of “change.” The court
was skeptical that “change” meant “add” in this context. It explained:
Not only does using the somewhat legalistic word “amend” to define the
garden-variety word “change” appear to run counter to the spirit of section 1644,
but the conclusion that “change” was intended to mean “add” is questionable
in light of the fact that the phrase stating that the Bank could “add” new terms
had been deleted from the revised version of the change of terms provision in
the account agreements in effect when the ADR bill stuffer was mailed.
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courts have agreed with Badie even when the credit agreements have
permitted additions or accommodated the consumer’s interest in opting
out of the agreement.282 The important issue was that the agreement
made no mention of dispute resolution, and the consumer had no inkling
that the creditor’s unilateral action could subsequently obliterate his
right to seek relief in a judicial forum. One court was concerned that the
change-in-terms provision could have unlimited application beyond
arbitration, and the consumer’s failure to object under these circumstances
could not be interpreted as consent to the new term.283
Nevertheless, consumers have not always prevailed in the battle of
terms. In Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, the court was not sympathetic to the
consumer’s claims of procedural and substantive unconscionability.284
Although the cardholder agreement was rather lengthy, it did indicate
that the creditor could amend it from time to time by notifying the
consumer, and there was no limitation on the bank’s power to do so.285
The notification gave the consumer the option of rejecting the arbitration
provision,286 and the court viewed this as an important feature of the
arrangement because it identified this option as one of the elements
missing in Badie.287 But the court in Badie seemed more concerned with
the kind of terms that the creditor was trying to impose on the consumer,
and that was relevant to the terms that the parties contemplated at the
time of their agreement.288

Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285. The court also had to consider the “terms” that the parties
had in mind in their original agreement. See id. at 285–86.
282. See Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A.04-507, 2004 WL 1508518, at
*2–5 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004); Myers v. MBNA Am. & N. Am. Capitol Corp., No. CV
00-163-M-DWM, 2001 WL 965063, at *3–5 (D. Mont. Mar. 20, 2001).
283. See Perry, 2004 WL 1508518, at *3–5; see also Stone v. Golden Wexler &
Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197–98 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). But see In re Am. Express
Merchs. Litig., No. 03-CV-9592(GBD), 2006 WL 662341, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2006).
284. 125 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001).
285. See id. at 826.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 833 (citing Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998)).
288. The Badie court made this point about the change-in-terms provision:
All the provisions of the original credit account agreements concerned matters
that were integral to that relationship. In this context, there is nothing about
the original terms that would have alerted a customer to the possibility that the
Bank might one day in the future invoke the change of terms provision to add a
clause that would allow it to impose ADR on the customer.
Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287.
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The court in Bank One found that the notice about the arbitration
clause was clear and that it was unlikely to cause the consumer any
difficulty, as it addressed the simple topic of arbitration.289 On the issue
of substantive unconscionability, the consumer had the burden of showing
that he would have to bear unreasonable costs in the arbitration setting.290
He could not merely make that assertion and hope to prevail without
evidence to that effect. Furthermore, a consumer would not be denied any
remedy by submitting himself to arbitration, since an arbitrator could
grant any relief that was available under substantive law.
The acceptance of the change-in-terms provision depends in large measure
on whether it is viewed from the perspective of unconscionability or
from a lender’s authority to amend the agreement in this way. The latter
approach leads to interpretation of the contract between the parties. That
interpretation depends inevitably upon the parties’ intent, but where the
contract is ambiguous, it should be construed against the drafter. The
change-in-terms provision in Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C. was
typically broad because it allowed the bank to “amend or change” any part
of the agreement and to “add or remove requirements” at any time.291
One could not have hoped for broader language than that, but nowhere in
the agreement was there any mention of arbitration. The court sided with
Badie in looking at the change-in-terms clause to determine the universe
of terms affected by it, but it could find only references to annual
percentage rate, periodic rates, fees, and other charges.292 By interpreting
the contract in this way, the court tried to avoid any allegations of illusoriness
by preserving the elements of the bargain between the parties.
It is understandable that the court would take this approach; a court
should concentrate on the kind of terms that the change-in-terms provision
is intended to affect. If the provision purports to affect something that
was totally outside the parties’ contemplation at the time of their agreement,
it runs counter to the idea that there should be a meeting of the minds for

289. The consumer had hoped to persuade the court on the issue of procedural
unconscionability because “the circumstances surrounding the addition of the arbitration
provision to the parties’ alleged contract were so unfair as to compel a conclusion that
there was no voluntary meeting of the minds.” Bank One, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 830. The
theory was that the small paragraph dealing with a change in terms gave no inkling of the
possible addition of an arbitration provision. See id. at 830–31. This aspect of procedural
unconscionability results from “an absence of meaningful choice.” 1 FARNSWORTH,
supra note 279, § 4.28.
290. It is true that the possibility of large arbitration costs could conceivably prevent
a consumer from vindicating his statutory rights through arbitration. But a party must
come forward and show that he is likely to incur such costs. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
291. 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
292. See id. at 197–98.
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the parties to be bound.293 A change, whatever it is, should not come as
a total surprise to the consumer, and it would be indeed, if it did not fall
within that universe of terms covered by the agreement. As a matter of
principle, the agreement should be construed against the creditor in this
situation, and any ambiguity about the change-in-terms provision should
be resolved in the consumer’s favor.294 There is surely a great disparity in
the parties’ bargaining power, and an ambiguous contract that is a product of
the creditor’s handiwork should not be construed against the consumer.
Furthermore, a resolution of the problem should not depend upon whether
the change that is the subject of contention is labeled an addition, alteration,
or merely a change. The focus should be on the kind of term that the
creditor is seeking to introduce.295
293. The Badie court identified the main issue as follows:
Our focus is on whether the words of the original account agreements mean
that the Bank’s customers, by agreeing to a unilateral change of terms provision,
intended to give the Bank the power in the future to terminate its customers’
existing right to have disputes resolved in the civil justice system, including
their constitutionally based right to a jury trial. In our view, the object, nature
and subject matter of these agreements strongly support the conclusion that the
customers did not so intend, and that they, as promisors with respect to the
change of terms provision, had no inkling that the Bank understood the
provision differently.
Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 288 (Ct. App. 1998).
294. This technique, contra proferentem, allows a court to construe an ambiguous
provision in a contract against the drafter. See 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 24.27 (rev. ed. 1998). For example, in Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp.,
the court construed the provision under consideration as allowing the lender either “(1)
to modify only those terms already contained or contemplated in the original Agreement,
or (2) to both modify and insert additional, previously uncontemplated, terms to the
original agreement.” No. Civ.A.04-507, 2004 WL 1508518, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 6,
2004). Recognizing the lender as being in the stronger bargaining position in relation to
the consumer, the court construed the ambiguous language against the lender as the
drafter, and held that the unilateral change-in-terms provision applied only to terms
contemplated in the original agreement. Id.
295. Compare In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., No. 03-CV-9592(GBD), 2006 WL
662341, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006) (“The change-in-terms clause . . . when coupled
with other terms in the . . . contracts, rendered the arbitration amendment . . . a reasonable
addition to the original contracts.”), with Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341
F. Supp. 2d 189, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that since the contract did not mention
any terms relating to dispute resolution, the arbitration agreement was not within the
universe of terms covered by the change-in-terms provision), and Union Planters Bank v.
Rogers, 912 So. 2d 116, 120 (Miss. 2005) (finding no agreement on arbitration in
absence of notice and negotiation of arbitration endorsement), and Maestle v. Best Buy
Co., No. 79827, 2005 WL 1907282, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2005) (finding no
meeting of the minds about including arbitration clause when contract formed). An
arbitration provision can have a profound impact on the parties’ agreement. If the
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VI. THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES
A. The Statutory Limits
Except as otherwise provided, the statute in its current form imposes
civil liability on a creditor that violates any provision.296 A consumer
may recover both actual damages and statutory damages.297 In the case
of statutory damages, a consumer does not have to show any detrimental
reliance, because the purpose of the statute is to give a creditor an incentive
to comply with the statutory requirements by allowing a consumer to act
as a private enforcer.298 It is not even necessary for a consumer to show
that the creditor knew about the violation or that the consumer was
misled by the creditor’s conduct.299
When Congress passed TILA in 1968, it provided for statutory damages
of twice the finance charge, but it set a minimum recovery of $100 and a
maximum of $1000.300 A 1974 amendment provided for the recovery of
actual damages in addition to statutory damages, and also added a

arbitration itself is in dispute, a court may adjudicate the claim, but an arbitrator makes
the decision about the contract itself. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967). The severability rule applies even when there is a
claim that the contract containing the arbitration clause is void for illegality because of a
usurious interest rate. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v.
Cardegna that the arbitrator must rule on any such challenge because it went to the
validity of the contract as a whole, and for that purpose there is no distinction between
voidness and voidability. 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
296. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2000).
297. Id. § 1640(a)(1), (2).
298. See Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 442–43 (5th Cir. 1998);
Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1148 (11th Cir. 1994); Jones v. TransOhio
Sav. Ass’n, 747 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1984); Bizier v. Globe Fin. Servs., 654 F.2d 1,
2 (1st Cir. 1981); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Fin. Co., 630 F.2d 641, 647 (8th Cir.
1980); Recovery of Damages Statutory and Compensatory, CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTHIN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., May 2005, at 6.
299. See Zamarippa v. Cy’s Car Sales, Inc., 674 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1982);
Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980); Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales,
Inc., 593 F.2d 538, 539 (3d Cir. 1979); Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d
444, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Haw. Cmty. Fed. Credit Union v. Keka, 11 P.3d 1, 18 (Haw.
2000).
300. The section governing statutory damages in 1968 provided in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails . . . to disclose
to any person any information required . . . to be disclosed to that person is
liable to that person in an amount equal to the sum of
(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the
transaction, except that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less
than $100 nor greater than $1,000; and
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability,
the costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as
determined by the court.
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. 1, § 130(a), 82 Stat. 146, 157 (1968).
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separate provision for class actions.301 The separate subparagraph
for statutory damages in an individual action maintained the previous
$100/$1000 limits. A further amendment in 1976 added a clause dealing
with consumer leases and restricted recovery thereunder to “25 per centum
of the total amount of monthly payments under the lease,” but the language
dealing with the $100/$1000 limits then followed both clause (i) dealing
with other consumer transactions and clause (ii) dealing with consumer
leases.302 After the 1976 amendment relating to consumer leases, it was
generally agreed that the $100/$1000 limits applied to all consumer
transactions—both non-lease transactions in clause (i) and lease transactions
in clause (ii).303
Had there been no further amendments, there would hardly have been
any difficulty with § 1640(a)(2)(A). But that was not to be, for Congress
amended the section again in 1995 by adding a new clause (iii) dealing
with statutory damages for violations in closed-end transactions secured
by real property or a dwelling, and setting the $200/$2000 limits for such
violations.304 The section now had a clause (i) and clause (ii) followed by

301. The 1974 amendment converted the old paragraph (1) of the 1968 statute into a
new paragraph (2) with two parts, (A) and (B). In order to accommodate this new
framework, Congress had to change the word paragraph to subparagraph. The new
section then read as follows:
(2)(A) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge . . . except that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be less
than $100 nor greater than $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may allow . . . and
the total recovery in such action shall not be more than the lesser of $100,000
or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor . . . .
Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1517, 1518 (emphasis
added).
302. After the 1976 amendment, the statute allowed statutory damages as follows:
(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance charge in
connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the case of an individual action
relating to a consumer lease . . . 25 per centum of the total amount of monthly
payments under the lease, except that the liability under this subparagraph shall
not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000 . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975), amended by Consumer Leasing Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(2), 90 Stat. 257, 260.
303. See Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995);
Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983); Dryden v.
Lou Budke’s Arrow Fin. Co., 661 F.2d 1186, 1191 n.7 (8th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Pub.
Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 359 (5th Cir. 1979).
304. Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, § 6, 109 Stat.
271, 274.
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the $100/$1000 limits, and clause (iii) followed by the $200/$2000 limits.305
In light of the previous consensus that the $100/$1000 limits applied to
both clauses (i) and (ii), the question then became whether the addition
of clause (iii) wrought a change in the statute’s interpretation so that the
limits should thereafter apply to clause (ii) only, because the language
restricted it to “this subparagraph,” or whether it should apply to both clauses.
The Supreme Court answered the question in Koons Buick Pontiac
GMC, Inc. v. Nigh when a consumer was trying to recover under clause
(i) for a creditor’s violation in a consumer transaction.306 The Court
acknowledged that the purpose of the 1995 amendment was to establish
a more generous limit for closed-end mortgages, but that there was no
congressional intent to repeal the accepted $100/$1000 limits in clause
(i).307 Before 1995, clause (i) covered closed-end mortgages and the 1995
amendment merely carved out such mortgages for special treatment in a
new clause (iii) with respect to minimum/maximum limits.308 The Court
could find no evidence that Congress intended to change the pre-1995
interpretation that applied the $100/$1000 limits to the entire class of
consumer credit transactions captured by clauses (i) and (ii), which at the
time also included closed-end mortgages.309
The Court chose not to rely solely on the statutory language, for then
it would have had to deal with the literal meaning of the word
“subparagraph” in clause (ii).310 In this context, the word could hardly have
covered all of subparagraph (A) in light of the separate restriction for
closed-end mortgages contained in clause (iii).311 The Court was left then
with the alternative of examining the statutory history and interpretative
sources to glean congressional intent. Although Justice Stevens concurred,
he thought it quite plausible to read clause (i) as prescribing the amount

305. Id.
306. 543 U.S. 50 (2004).
307. See id. at 63.
308. Clause (iii) now provides that a consumer may recover “in the case of an
individual action relating to a credit transaction not under an open end credit plan that is
secured by real property or a dwelling, not less than $200 or greater than $2,000.” 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000).
309. See Koons, 543 U.S. at 62. The House Report clarified that “this amendment
increases the statutory damages available in closed end credit transactions secured by
real property or a dwelling.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-193, at 99 (1995).
310. The Court explained that “[t]he word ‘subparagraph’ is generally used to refer
to a subdivision preceded by a capital letter, and the word ‘clause’ is generally used to
refer to a subdivision preceded by a lower case Roman numeral.” Koons, 543 U.S. at 61.
311. There was no disagreement that Congress meant to establish a more generous
scheme for closed-end mortgages. See id. at 62 (citing Strange v. Monogram Credit
Card Bank of Ga., 129 F.3d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1997)). This did not mean, however, that
Congress intended to remove the accepted $100/$1000 limits in § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) and
apply such limits only to § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii). See id.
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of damages without setting minimum/maximum limits.312 Nevertheless,
he saw a way out of the “unambiguous statutory command” not by alleging
that an absurd result would ensue, but by using common sense.313 That
approach led him to the statutory history which made it clear that
Congress did not intend to tamper with the pre-1995 interpretation that
applied the limits to both clauses (i) and (ii).314 Justice Stevens did not
regard himself, therefore, as constrained by any canon of statutory
construction that allowed him to examine only legislative history for the
resolution of ambiguities or the avoidance of absurdities. He was perfectly
content to look at the whole picture in order to determine the place of the
word “subparagraph” in clause (ii).315
It was not surprising that the Court applied the $100/$1000 limits to
both clauses (i) and (ii). After all, there was no disagreement about the
pre-1995 meaning of the section,316 and Congress did not materially alter
the text of clauses (i) or (ii) when it amended the statute in 1995 to
accommodate a cap on closed-end mortgages. After the amendment, the
statute remained ambiguous, as the reference to “subparagraph” could no

312. See id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
313. Justice Stevens made his point as follows: “Common sense is often more
reliable than rote repetition of canons of statutory construction. It is unfortunate that
wooden reliance on those canons has led to unjust results from time to time. Fortunately,
today the Court has provided us with a lucid opinion that reflects the sound application
of common sense.” Id. at 65–66. Justice Stevens supported the majority’s holding even
though he found the statute unambiguous. Id. The Court saw an ambiguity and therefore
looked to resolve it by examining the rest of the statutory scheme, including the statutory
history. See id. at 60–62 (majority opinion).
314. See id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
315. On this point Justice Stevens acknowledged that “it is always appropriate to
consider all available evidence of Congress’ true intent when interpreting its work
product.” Id. In doing so, Justice Stevens interprets a statute in a way that implements
congressional purpose even at the risk of departing from the statute’s semantics. The
opinions of the other Justices are to be contrasted with that of Justice Scalia who, in his
dissent, gave a good example of the textualist approach by giving “dispositive weight to
the structure of § 1640(a)(2)(A), which indicates that the exception is part of clause (ii)
and thus does not apply to clause (i).” Id. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Scalia
was not keen to consider the statute’s purposes even on the pretext of rescuing Congress
from its drafting mistakes. See id. at 76 (citing Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526,
542 (2004)).
316. See Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996); Cowen v.
Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995); Mars v. Spartanburg
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow
Fin. Co., 661 F.2d 1186, 1191 n.7 (8th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d
349, 359 (5th Cir. 1979).
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longer apply to all of subparagraph (A).317 It was this ambiguity that led
the Court to the statutory history and the previous judicial interpretation
of the pre-1995 versions. The Court’s examination of the overall statutory
scheme318 led to the conclusion that Congress had enacted a “scrivener’s
error” into law.319 Although some members of the Court favored always
looking at all available evidence of congressional intent, even when there
seems to be no ambiguity in the statute,320 the Court found solace in the
statutory history because it detected an ambiguity.321 It was a matter of
ascertaining whether Congress intended in 1995 to do something other than
merely adding clause (iii) to place a minimum/maximum cap on damages in
closed-end mortgage transactions. Congress left things as they found them
in 1995 after adding that clause, and that was enough to convince the
Court that the $100/$1000 limits should apply to both clauses (i) and (ii).
B. Violations Covered
Disagreement over the liability section has arisen in other contexts.
The statute requires a creditor to make certain disclosures in closed-end
transactions and also dictates the form and timing of those disclosures.322
The civil liability section imposes liability, except as otherwise provided, on

317. Congress could have removed the ambiguity by stating in clause (ii) “liability
under this clause” instead of “liability under this subparagraph.” That would have left no
doubt that Congress intended to apply the $100/$1000 limits to consumer leases only. In
reaching a sensible solution to the problem, the Court viewed clause (iii) as merely removing
closed-end mortgages from clause (i)’s coverage only because clause (iii) provides $200/$2000
limits instead of 100/$1000 limits. See Koons, 543 U.S. at 62. The Court took a holistic
approach in construing the statute by examining the statutory scheme, rather than
looking at the statutory language in isolation. See id. at 60; see also Jonathan T. Molot,
The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 n.174 (2006).
318. See Koons, 543 U.S. at 63.
319. Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
320. Justice Breyer joined with Justice Stevens in suggesting that “it is always
appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress’ true intent when interpreting
its work product.” Id.
321. See id. at 62 (majority opinion). In trying to come to some reasonable understanding
of the statute’s meaning, the Court looked to Congress’ goals in enacting the statute.
One commentator explains the difference between textualists and purposivists in this
context. Professor Manning explains that “textualism means that in resolving ambiguity,
interpreters should give precedence to semantic context . . . rather than policy context . . . .”
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
110 (2006). With respect to purposivism, “the dictates of legislative supremacy obligate
the interpreter to help the legislature realize the statute’s overarching goals.” Id. The
Court in Koons seemed to come down on the side of the purposivists, with Justice Scalia
advocating for the textualist approach. Compare Koons, 543 U.S. at 62, with id. at 73
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the difference between the two camps, see
Molot, supra note 317; Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).
322. See 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a), (b) (2000).

668

GRIFFITH.DOC

[VOL. 44: 611, 2007]

11/15/2007 8:59:09 AM

Truth in Lending
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

a creditor that fails to comply with the disclosure requirements.323 The
section then goes on to say that in connection with the closed-end disclosures,
a creditor will have liability only for failing to comply with the disclosure
requirements of certain paragraphs of § 1638(a).324 Therefore, not all
disclosure failures will lead to statutory damages against a creditor. Section
1638(b) prescribes the form and timing requirements of disclosures for
closed-end transactions, but § 1640 does not say what will happen if a
creditor violates § 1638(b).325 Here is where the disagreement arises. The
question is whether § 1640 limits statutory damages to the violations
specifically mentioned, or whether the section provides general liability
for noncompliance in the absence of a specific exemption.
TILA stipulates that, except as otherwise provided, a consumer may
recover both actual and statutory damages if a creditor fails to comply
with any requirement. In Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., the
consumers alleged that the creditor had not given them the required
disclosures before it extended credit, thus becoming liable for statutory
damages by violating § 1638(b)(1).326 This set the stage for an interpretation
of § 1638(b)(1) because § 1638(b)–(d) were not “disclosures referred to
in section 1638” and thus did not fall within the exception to statutory
damages covered in § 1640(a).327 Section 1640(a) identifies the specific
disclosures in § 1638(a) that attract statutory damages in case of a violation,
but because § 1638(b) is not a disclosure section, the court could not find
any support for excluding a § 1638(b) violation from eligibility for
statutory damages.328

Id.

323. See id. § 1640(a).
324. The statute provides as follows:
In connection with the disclosures referred to in section 1638 of this title, a
creditor shall have a liability determined under paragraph (2) only for failing to
comply with the requirements of section 1635 of this title or of paragraph (2)
(insofar as it requires a disclosure of the “amount financed”), (3), (4), (5), (6),
or (9) of section 1638(a) of this title . . . .
325. The specific sections mentioned in § 1640(a) are § 1635 and § 1638(a). See id.
326. 145 F. Supp. 2d 878, 882 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
327. Id. at 889.
328. The court explained as follows:
The only “disclosures referred to in section 1638” are contained in subsection
1638(a), which is entitled, “Required disclosures by creditor.” Of the disclosures
mentioned in 1638(a), only the enumerated numbers are subject to statutory
damages. No dispute exists that statutory damages are not available for disclosures
referred to in § 1638(a) that are not listed—that is, §§ 1638(a)(1), (2) (in part),
(7), (8), and (10)–(14).
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In Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., the Seventh Circuit took a
different tack on this issue by disallowing statutory damages for a violation
that did not appear in § 1640(a).329 This time the court concentrated on
the word “only” in the paragraph which allows damages “only for failing
to comply with the requirements of section 1635 . . . or of paragraph (2)
(insofar as it requires a disclosure of the ‘amount financed’), (3), (4), (5),
(6), or 9 of section 1638(a).”330 The court viewed the identification of
the violations as a “closed list” that could not be judicially expanded to
accommodate the consumer’s complaint about the creditor’s dereliction.331
In Baker v. Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., the Sixth Circuit joined the Seventh
Circuit in rejecting statutory damages for a § 1638(b)(1) violation.332
The court viewed the statute as creating two types of violations:
(1) complete nondisclosure of the stipulated items in § 1638(a), and
(2) disclosure of such items, but not in the manner required by
§ 1638(b)(1).333 The court treated the violation in (1) as eligible for statutory
damages, but not the violation in (2).334 But the court went further than
that by holding that § 1640(b) protected the creditor because the creditor
had corrected its error by making the necessary disclosures within sixty
days after discovering it.335 It was surprising that the court opted to apply
this correction of error defense to a situation where the creditor failed to
provide disclosures prior to consummation, because the defense is normally
entertained only for disclosures that the lender has already made, not for
those that it has failed to make.336 Any other interpretation would allow
a lender to avoid the form and timing requirements of § 1638(b) by
Id. at 888.
329. 202 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2000).
330. Id. at 991 (emphasis added by the court) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2000)).
331. Id.
332. 349 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2003).
333. Id. at 869.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 871. The statute provides a correction of error defense as follows:
A creditor . . . has no liability under this section . . . for any failure to comply
with any requirement imposed under this part . . . if within sixty days after
discovering an error, . . . and prior to the institution of an action under this
section or the receipt of written notice of the error from the obligor, the
creditor or assignee notifies the person concerned of the error and makes
whatever adjustments in the appropriate account are necessary to assure that
the person will not be required to pay an amount in excess of the charge
actually disclosed, or the dollar equivalent of the annual percentage rate
actually disclosed, whichever is lower.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) (2000).
336. See Thomka v. A.Z. Chevrolet, Inc., 619 F.2d 246, 251–52 (3d. Cir. 1980);
Watson v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, Inc., No. Civ.A 05-0244-CG-C, 2006 WL 328174, at
*3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 2006); Jumbo v. Nestor Motors, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (D.
Ariz. 1977); Ralls v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Ralls), 230 B.R. 508, 518 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1999).
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forgiving late disclosures, when in fact Truth in Lending contemplates
timely disclosures for a consumer’s consideration.337
In any event, this defense requires a creditor to act within sixty days
after discovering an error.338 In Baker, there was nothing left to discover,
for the creditor had intentionally failed to respond to the consumer’s
request at closing for a copy of the disclosures.339 It is open to question,
therefore, whether the court should have relied on § 1640(b) as an alternative
ground for a resolution of the problem. It is not clear that if § 1640(b) is
restricted to clerical or mathematical errors, it would duplicate § 1640(c)
dealing with the bona fide error defense. After all, the correction of
error defense has a time limit attached to it, and it protects the creditor if
the creditor acts to correct the error, whereas the bona fide error defense
is available if the error was unintentional and the creditor had procedures
in place to avoid the problem.
The Baker court did not have to depend on § 1640(b) in order to deny
statutory damages to the consumer. It could have recognized the consumer’s
complaint as one lodged “in connection with the disclosures referred to
in section 1638”340 and liability as attaching only for failing to comply
with § 1635 or certain parts of § 1638(a).341 The reference to § 1635 only
337. It is unlikely that Congress intended to allow a lender free rein to make its
disclosures after the transaction without incurring any liability once it falls within § 1638(b).
A consumer would surely be at a disadvantage in this context, because he would be
deprived of an opportunity to reflect on the terms of the transaction. It has been said that
“TILA’s timing requirements have no meaning if disclosures always can be provided
after-the-fact with no penalty.” NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 8.6.5.3.4
(Supp. 2006). But see ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 5, ¶ 12.05[3][a], at 839 (“Congress
granted a creditor the right to cure ‘any failure to comply with any requirement.’”).
338. “A creditor . . . has no liability . . . for any failure to comply with any requirement
imposed under this part or part E of this subchapter, if within sixty days after discovering
an error, . . . the creditor . . . notifies the person concerned of the error . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b)
(2000).
339. The court recited the facts as follows: “[D]espite being asked for a copy of the
signed contract, Defendant refused to provide Plaintiffs with a copy of either contract.
Plaintiffs finally received a copy of the second contract approximately three weeks later . . . .”
Baker, 349 F.3d at 864. It is open to question whether there was anything for the creditor in
Baker to discover when it intentionally refused to give the consumer the disclosures at
closing. See id. It is submitted that the sixty-day correction defense should not
apply, as in this case, to an intentional violation. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
supra note 4, § 8.6.5.3.4 n.404.3 (Supp. 2006).
340. The creditor’s failure to comply with the requirements of § 1635 and certain
parts of § 1638(a) gives rise to liability, but it is “[i]n connection with the disclosures
referred to in section 1638.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2000).
341. The Seventh Circuit took this approach in Brown v. Payday Check Advance,
when it denied statutory damages for a creditor’s violation of the format requirements in
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serves to emphasize the point that the drafters must have had other
remedies in mind when they delineated the limits of liability in § 1640(a).
In the same way that the drafters referred to § 1635 in discussing
liability in connection with § 1638 disclosures, they could have included
any other section they had in mind for statutory damages. Section 1638(b)
plays a role in the disclosure scheme by requiring the creditor to act at a
certain time, but such action still takes place “in connection with the
disclosures referred to in § 1638.” The court could have buttressed
its position by emphasizing that § 1638(b) is not an independent mandate
totally divorced from the § 1638 disclosures. As a matter of fact, § 1638(b)
refers to “the disclosures required under subsection (a).” It seems, therefore,
that the statutory damages contemplated relate to the same disclosures
recognized by § 1638 and § 1640. While it is true that § 1638(b)(1) does
not prescribe disclosures, it fulfills its mission by dictating the time
when a creditor should make its disclosures, and in that sense justifies
§ 1640’s reference to it.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is evident that Truth in Lending has stood the test of time and has
weathered a storm of criticism over the years.342 Nevertheless, there is
the statute. 202 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury,
Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121, 126–27 (W.D. Mich. 2002); Stevens v. Brookdale Dodge, Inc., No.
Civ. 00-2632 JELJGL, 2002 WL 31941158, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 2002); Nigh v.
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 535, 549 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d 319
F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004).
342. In the early days when Congress was considering Truth in Lending legislation,
a House Report gave some inkling of the problems that consumers faced. It reported:
Today the consumer is faced with a number of credit disclosure practices,
most of which are not directly comparable to one another. With respect to rate,
some creditors employ an “add-on” rate, which is based on the original balance
of the obligation as opposed to the declining balance. This has the effect of
underestimating the simple annual rate by approximately 50 percent.
....
Other creditors add a number of additional fees or charges to the basic finance
charge, such as credit investigation fees, credit life insurance, and various “service”
charges. This permits a creditor to quote a low rate while actually earning a
higher yield through the additional fees and charges.
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1970–71.
Senator Paul Douglas introduced the first Truth in Lending bill in 1960, S. 2755, 86th
Cong. (1960). When he introduced a 1963 version, he commented: “The consumer is
faced with a bewildering and indeed incomprehensible variety of rate statements and
charges when he borrows money or buys an article on the installment plan.” 109 CONG.
REC. 2029 (1963). When the Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. 1, 82 Stat.
146 (1968), was passed in 1968, it set a new disclosure standard for consumer loans. It
was only a question of time before Congress had to respond to the criticism of the
constituencies affected by the new legislation. The 1980 Senate Report identified some
of the problems: “There is considerable evidence, for example, that disclosure forms
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still work to be done to make the required disclosures palatable to
lenders and consumers alike, and to remove some of the ambiguities in
TILA. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Household Credit Services,
Inc. v. Pfennig, the term “finance charge” standing alone is ambiguous,343
and there is “some connection between the over-limit fee and an extension
of credit.”344 But the Court agreed that the “incident to” language in the
definition of “finance charge” does not clarify whether TILA requires a
substantial connection, and where TILA deals with over-limit fees, it
requires their disclosure “in connection with an extension of credit”
rather than “incident to the extension of credit.”345 This ambiguity in the
statutory language led the Court to rely on the regulation, which
excludes over-limit fees from the definition of “finance charge.”346 But
the Pfennig decision merely highlights the difficulty of categorizing the
finance charge. Although Regulation Z defines it as the cost of credit,347
there is no unanimity about the constituent elements thereof, and thus
lenders have always tried to bring themselves within the exceptions
recognized by TILA and Regulation Z.348 The more charges a lender

given consumers are too lengthy and difficult to understand. Creditors, on the other
hand, have encountered increasing difficulty in keeping current with a steady stream of
administrative interpretations and amendments, as well as highly technical judicial
decisions.” S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 16 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 252.
As a result, Congress passed the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act in
1980, which addressed most of the concerns about information overload and lengthy,
legalistic disclosures. Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, 94 Stat. 168 (1980) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
343. 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004).
344. Id. at 240.
345. Id. at 241.
346. See id. at 240–41. Regulation Z, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2000), excludes “[c]harges . . . for exceeding a credit
limit.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c) (2007).
347. Regulation Z defines the finance charge as follows:
The finance charge is the cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount. It
includes any charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the
extension of credit. It does not include any charge of a type payable in a comparable
cash transaction.
12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a).
348. The Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
addressed concerns about the finance charge in a 1998 joint report to Congress. They
made the following observations:
The calculation and disclosure of the finance charge and the APR have been at
the heart of the debate over both the usefulness and the regulatory burden of
TILA. Much of the difficulty arises not from the mathematical requirements
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can exclude from the finance charge, the better off it is in terms of
disclosing the cost of credit.349 Two lenders disclosing the same finance
charge expressed as an annual percentage rate may in fact be charging
the consumer different fees that are not included in the finance charge,
but the consumer will never be any wiser about the matter. It is to the
consumer’s advantage, therefore, for lenders to be governed by a more
reliable indicator of the cost of credit, and this can be accomplished by
reducing as much as possible the exceptions relating to the finance
charge.350 Even though Regulation Z excludes “[c]harges . . . for paying
items that overdraw an account,”351 the exception applies unless the parties
previously agreed in writing that such charges should be part of the
finance charge.352 This is but one example of a lender being able to opt
for its own designation of a particular charge. In this instance, a lender
may avoid the label of a finance charge simply by avoiding a written
agreement with the consumer, even if the consumer habitually exceeds his
credit limit without any objection from the lender. Something must be
done to provide a more realistic definition of a finance charge.353
Truth in Lending has disappointed consumers in another area: the
timing and form of disclosures. If the lender puts the Truth in Lending
disclosures in the same document as the credit contract, some courts354
for calculating the finance charge and the APR, but from the issue of what is a
finance charge and what is not.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
AND THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 9 (1998), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/tila.pdf [hereinafter FRB & HUD JOINT REPORT].
349. The FRB & HUD Joint Report made the point: “Whatever the initial intention,
however, neither the finance charge nor its corresponding APR currently discloses a total
cost of credit. From the start, the Congress narrowed the concept by carving out several
fees from the definition of the finance charge.” Id. at 8. It has been said that “Congress
never uniformly rationalized the definition of the finance charge in light of the purpose
of the TIL Act because it contains numerous exceptions to the general rule that cannot be
justified theoretically even if they make sense practically or politically.” ROHNER &
MILLER, supra note 5, ¶ 3.02[1]; see also Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and
Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 58
(2005).
350. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 3.2.2; Rohner & Durkin,
supra note 274, at 150; Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV.
807, 901 (2003).
351. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(3) (2007).
352. Id.
353. See FRB & HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 348, at 13–14; Rohner & Durkin,
supra note 274, at 189.
354. See Spearman v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 312 F.3d 848, 850–51 (7th
Cir. 2002); Haun v. Don Mealey Imports, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1304–06 (M.D. Fla.
2003); Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 535, 547–49 (E.D. Va.
2001), aff’d 319 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004).
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and the Official Staff Commentary355 agree that the consumer can review
and then sign a multiple-copy contract, and then the lender can separate
the copies and give one copy to the consumer. The lender does not have to
give the consumer two separate copies of the document before consummation.
The consumer’s interests would be better served if the lender gave the
consumer two copies of the document in such a transaction in order to remove
any doubts that it has provided the disclosures before consummation in a
form that the consumer may keep.356 The Commentary advises that a lender
complies with the law if it gives the consumer a copy of the document
containing the credit contract and disclosures to read and sign, and the
consumer then receives a copy to keep when he becomes obligated.357
The Commentary also recognizes that the consumer must be free “to take
possession of and review the document in its entirety before signing.”358
There is no better way of making that point than by giving the consumer a
copy that will remain his at all cost, and then once he is satisfied, giving
him another copy for signature. The essential feature of the transaction
is to convince the consumer of the importance of his ability to keep a
preconsummation copy of the document, and that he does not have to
depend on a signing to keep it either before or after review.
A consumer needs more protection on another front. The change-in-terms
provision which some lenders have used to cause mischief in the marketplace
should be accommodated in some fashion as part of the required Truth in
Lending disclosures. It is not satisfactory for a lender to entice a consumer
into a transaction with attractive features, only to burden him shortly
thereafter with less attractive terms that the consumer could not have
anticipated. If it is important for a lender to highlight the salient terms of the
credit offer, then it must be equally important for the lender to indicate in
the same location the conditions under which those terms are subject to
change. That disclosure framework should also make room for the possibility
of arbitration, so that a consumer is not left wondering whether he must
renounce a judicial forum in favor of arbitration.

355. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007).
356. See Polk v. Crown Auto, Inc., 221 F.3d 691, 692 (4th Cir. 2000); Gillom v.
Ralph Thayer Automotive Livonia, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 763, 768 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Kilbourn
v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121, 124 (W.D. Mich. 2002); Walters v. First
State Bank, 134 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781–82 (W.D. Va. 2001).
357. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3.
358. Id.
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Finally, now that the Supreme Court has spoken on the question of
damages, there is no longer any doubt that the $100/$1000 limits apply
to both lease and non-lease transactions.359 However, one can only
hope that any overhaul of the statute will take a neater approach to
§ 1640(a)(2)(A),360 and while the drafters are at it, they may want to
clarify the protection about damages for a violation of § 1638(b).

of:

359.
360.

See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 51 (2004).
Section 1640(a) provides for damages in an individual action equal to the sum

(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure;
(2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance charge
in connection with the transaction, (ii) in the case of an individual action relating to
a consumer lease under part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total amount
of monthly payments under the lease, except that liability under this subparagraph
shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000, or (iii) in the case of an
individual action relating to a credit transaction not under an open end credit plan
that is secured by real property or a dwelling, not less than $200 or greater than
$2,000 . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1), (2)(A) (2000). The ambiguity that the Court in Koons Buick
Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh had to deal with centered on the words “liability under this
subparagraph.” 543 U.S. 50, 54–55 (2004). The word “subparagraph” seems a little out
of place in the literal sense.
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